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Abstract
This thesis investigates agency problems in projects whereas the principal cannot effectively monitor the
progress. In Chapter 2, the baseline model is studied. It is assumed that the success of innovation requires an
intermediate breakthrough and a final breakthrough, but the occurrence of the intermediate breakthrough is
privately known to the agent. The principal provides incentives to the agent through a termination date and a
reward for the final success. Two properties of optimal contracts are identified. First, conditional on the
termination date, the optimal contract induces efficient actions from the agent. Second, the reward for success
to the agent is in general non-monotone in success time and later success may be rewarded more.
In Chapter 3, I consider several modifications to the modeling assumptions and discuss their implications.
First, I study the case that the two breakthroughs need not be in a particular order, and the agent can choose
which task to work on first. It is shown that it is optimal to induce the agent to work on the more difficult task
first. Second, I consider the scenario where there is an ex ante probability that the project is a bad one and
breakthroughs never come. The optimal contract is no longer efficient conditional on the termination date.
Last, I allow the principal to receive informative signals on whether the intermediate breakthrough has
occurred.
In Chapter 4, I extend the baseline model by introducing randomly arriving buyers and apply it to study the
financing of startup firms with opportunities to be acquired. I show that the potential acquisition increases the
cost of providing incentives. Since an agent with low level of progress is ``bailed out" when an offer is made to
acquire firms with both high and low levels of progress, the agent has more incentive to shirk. In response, the
principal reduces the likelihood that the firm with high level of progress is sold. Moreover, the total financing
provided by the principal is less compared to the environment without buyers.
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ABSTRACT
DYNAMIC CONTRACTING WITH UNOBSERVED PROGRESS
Zehao Hu
George Mailath
This thesis investigates agency problems in projects whereas the principal cannot ef-
fectively monitor the progress. In Chapter 2, the baseline model is studied. It is assumed
that the success of innovation requires an intermediate breakthrough and a final break-
through, but the occurrence of the intermediate breakthrough is privately known to the
agent. The principal provides incentives to the agent through a termination date and a
reward for the final success. Two properties of optimal contracts are identified. First, con-
ditional on the termination date, the optimal contract induces efficient actions from the
agent. Second, the reward for success to the agent is in general non-monotone in success
time and later success may be rewarded more.
In Chapter 3, I consider several modifications to the modeling assumptions and dis-
cuss their implications. First, I study the case that the two breakthroughs need not be
in a particular order, and the agent can choose which task to work on first. It is shown
that it is optimal to induce the agent to work on the more difficult task first. Second, I
consider the scenario where there is an ex ante probability that the project is a bad one
and breakthroughs never come. The optimal contract is no longer efficient conditional on
v
the termination date. Last, I allow the principal to receive informative signals on whether
the intermediate breakthrough has occurred.
In Chapter 4, I extend the baseline model by introducing randomly arriving buyers
and apply it to study the financing of startup firms with opportunities to be acquired. I
show that the potential acquisition increases the cost of providing incentives. Since an
agent with low level of progress is “bailed out” when an offer is made to acquire firms
with both high and low levels of progress, the agent has more incentive to shirk. In
response, the principal reduces the likelihood that the firm with high level of progress
is sold. Moreover, the total financing provided by the principal is less compared to the
environment without buyers.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Most projects require continuing effort exerted or investment made before they succeed.
Examples include scientists conducting scientific research, researchers working on R&D
in a company, and entrepreneurs developing startup firms. Agency problems naturally
arise in such contexts, and previous work has provided useful insights on how the agent
should be incentivized (e.g., Bergemann and Hege (1998), Bergemann and Hege (2005),
Manso (2011), Hörner and Samuelson (2013) and Halac, Liu, and Kartik (2013)). In
existing literature, the success of a project is often modeled as a random arrival pro-
cess as effort are being exerted. This treatment ignores an important feature of such
projects: Typically a project consists of multiple steps and the success requires several
breakthroughs rather than being one-shot. In other words, before the agent can work to-
ward the final breakthrough that brings success, some intermediate breakthroughs must
first be achieved. For example, before a chemist proceeds to synthesize the final product,
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she may have to first find a way to produce an important intermediate chemical.
The multi-step nature of a project may have significant implications on how contracts
should be designed. What complicates the agency problem even more is that the agent
often has better knowledge about the progress of the project than the principal. After the
final breakthrough, the outcome is observable to all and performance can be tested. But
before that, it may be difficult for people outside the team, including the principal, to
monitor the level of progress. For example, Keil, Smith, Iacovou, and Thompson (2014b)
review a series of 14 studies, including Snow, Keil, and Wallace (2007), Keil, Smith, Ia-
covou, and Thompson (2014a) and Iacovou, Thompson, and Smith (2009), which demon-
strate the difficulties in monitoring the progress of IT projects. They conclude that project
staff tend to misreport information on project status. Moreover, it does not necessarily
help track the project progress to use an audit team or to have a senior executive involved
in the project; in fact, misreporting may increase in some cases.
In such environment, the progress of the project and chance of future success depend
(stochastically) on the agent’s past actions. Since the agent is better informed of the
project progress, information asymmetry endogenously arises along the way, even if ex
ante it is a problem of pure moral hazard. This creates difficulties for the principal to
design contracts and to provide incentives. The agent’s incentive to work depends on
the level of the progress (which affects the probability of future success). Ideally, the
principal would like to choose different financing decisions and reward schemes based on
how much progress has been achieved. But when the principal cannot differentiate agents
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with different levels of progress, the contract terms have to be the same for agents with
different levels of progress;1 yet their relevant incentives conditions have to be satisfied
simultaneously under the contract.
In this thesis, I investigate this agency problem in the context of a model of two-step
project, and study how the principal provides incentives to the agent when she cannot
monitor the intermediate progress of the project. By contrasting with the case where the
progress is observable and the case where the success only requires one breakthrough,
I highlight the implications of the unobserved progress on the contract structure. The
information asymmetry about the progress can actually lead to more efficient actions
induced in an optimal contract. Moreover, it results in possible non-monotonicity in the
reward schedule: later success may be rewarded more. Thus, the unobserved progress not
only is a more realistic assumption, but also allows us to gain additional insights.
I also extend the model to investigate a more complex contracting environment in
which the agent’s private knowledge about the progress of innovation is an important
concern. The application I consider is the financing of startup companies in the presence
of occasionally arriving buyers that make acquisition offers. A large portion of startups
end up being acquired or merged by other firms, and whether to “get big” or “get bought”
is an important choice. The startup’s founder usually knows better than the investor or
outside buyers about how much progress has been made on innovation and the future
prospects of the startup if not sold. In such an environment, the agent’s private infor-
1In principle, the contract can induce reports from the agent on the innovation progress, but in this
model, inducing and contracting on report do not improve the principal’s payoff, as discussed in section
A.1.
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mation about the progress matters both for incentives to work and for decision-making
on acquisition bids. These two aspects interact with each other: the principal would like
to provide proper incentives so that the agent can use his information for better decisions
about selling the company, but also needs to take into account that the incentives provided
upon acquisition offers will in turn affect the moral hazard problem in innovation. I thus
analyze the impact of potential acquisitions on agent’s incentives to innovate and princi-
pal’s finance decisions. Moreover, I examine how moral hazard in the innovation project
affects company sale decisions.
In the rest of the introduction, I preview the models and results of each chapter in
section 1.1, and discuss related literature in section 1.2.
1.1 Preview of the Models and Results
1.1.1 Baseline
Chapter 2 studies the baseline model. A principal finances an agent on an innovation
project (e.g., an investor finances an entrepreneur to launch a startup company). The suc-
cess of innovation requires two breakthroughs. In each period, if and only if a costly
investment is made, one breakthrough occurs with positive probability.2 Success is pub-
licly observable, but only the agent observes the first breakthrough. In each period, the
principal finances the agent with the cost of investment. There is a moral hazard problem:
2This feature that an action in a period affects the probability of the arrivial of some event is related to
Biais, Mariotti, Rochet, and Villeneuve (2010), who look at an environment in which the agent can exert
effort to reduce the probability of a large loss.
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the agent can shirk and divert funds for his private consumption instead of truly investing
in the project. As the project goes on, the agent develops into two possible types. I call
the agent that has made the first breakthrough the stage 1 agent and the one that has made
no breakthrough the stage 0 agent. The principal and agent can commit to a long-term
contract, but payments and financing decisions can only depend on the event of success
(but not the intermediate breakthrough).
In the first best outcome, the project is financed as long as success has not occurred,3
but this is not optimal for the principal because it gives the agent too much rent. In an
optimal contract, the principal chooses to finance the project until some termination time,
and rewards the agent depending on the date of success. The stage 1 agent will exert effort
as long as he is financed. In contrast, the stage 0 agent will stop investment and start fund
diversion some time before the termination date. This is because it becomes too expensive
to induce effort from the agent with no progress when it is close to the termination date.
The reward has to be very high because the probability of making two breakthroughs
becomes very low as time moves close to the termination time. Moreover, whenever the
stage 0 agent is induced to work, his incentive compatibility constraints are binding and
he is kept indifferent between working and shirking. In this way, the principal’s cost of
providing incentives is minimized.
I identify two properties of optimal contracts driven by the multi-step nature of the
innovation and the agent’s private knowledge of the project progress.
3This is because it is assumed that there is no ex ante uncertainty about the quality of the project.
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First, given the termination time of the principal’s financing, the induced agent’s ac-
tions maximize the total social surplus. In other words, the stage 1 agent always works
and the stage 0 agent is induced to work if and only if it is socially efficient to do so.
The reasons are as follows: Since financing cannot terminate only for the stage 0 agent
(because the principal does not know whether the agent is at stage 0 or stage 1), the total
rent available to the agent is independent of when the stage 0 agent stops working. Given
the total investment financed by the principal, the agent’s ex ante payoff is fixed. In order
to maximize the principal’s payoff, the contract needs to induce actions from the agent so
that the total social surplus from the project is maximized. I refer to this as efficiency from
ignorance, because this efficiency result will not hold if the first breakthrough is public
and contractible. In that environment, the principal prefers to terminates financing the
stage 0 agent earlier than socially optimal to provide extra incentives to work in earlier
periods. This comparison needs to be interpreted with caveats, because when the first
breakthrough is contractible, the total financing provided by the principal is different, and
depends on when the first breakthrough occurs. However, if there is a binding exogenous
deadline for innovation, due to either time or budget constraint, then the principal’s in-
ability to monitor the agent’s progress turns out to be beneficial from a social point of
view.4
4The efficiency from ignorance result resonates with the desirability of an arm’s-length relationship be-
tween principal and agent illustrated by Crémer (1995) and Bergemann and Hege (2005). In those environ-
ments, the benefit of loose monitoring comes from the lack of commitment, and arm’s-length relationship
makes threat of termination more credible. In my model, there is full commitment, so the principal cannot
benefit from not observing the intermediate breakthrough, but her inability to monitor the progress may
lead to more socially efficient outcome under some circumstances.
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Second, the reward scheme that minimizes incentive cost is non-monotonic in the date
of success. That is to say, the agent is not necessarily rewarded more for achieving success
earlier. If success only requires one breakthrough, the reward is strictly decreasing in the
date of success which Hörner and Samuelson (2013) identifies as the dynamic agency
cost. In that setting, earlier success needs to be rewarded more throughout the contracting
periods, because by working and possibly making success happen early, the agent gives
up the opportunity to divert a large amount of funds in the future. Back to the setting of
this paper, in the periods when the stage 0 agent is induced to work, the reward for success
is decreasing due to the dynamic agency cost. However, in some of the periods after the
stage 0 agent stops working, the reward for success is higher than if success happens in
earlier dates. The intuition is that as time passes, it becomes increasingly difficult for
stage 0 to reach success, so the increase in reward provides the extra incentive needed for
him to work when it is socially efficient to do so. Moreover, this is the most cost-effective
way to provide incentives because only the stage 1 agent will have a chance to achieve
success and get the higher rewards in these periods. The non-monotonicity of reward is
consistent with the use of time-vested stocks as part of the compensation for entrepreneurs
in startup companies.
1.1.2 Extensions and Discussions
In Chapter 3, I consider several modifications to the modeling assumptions and discuss
their implications.
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First, I study the case that the two breakthroughs need not be in a particular order, and
the agent can choose which task to work on first. It is shown that it is optimal to induce
the agent to work on the more difficult task first.
Second, I consider the scenario where there is an ex ante probability that the project
is a bad one and breakthroughs never come.The optimal contract is no longer efficient
conditional on the termination date.
Next, I allow the principal to receive informative signals on whether the intermediate
breakthrough has occurred. The social surplus generated is between the baseline case and
the perfectly observable progress case.
1.1.3 Application: Acquisition Offers
In Chapter 4, the model is extended to study the role of potential acquisitions in the
financing of startups. In addition to the baseline model discussed, I assume that at the
end of each period, a buyer randomly arrives and makes an offer to acquire the company,
and the agent decides to accept or reject it. The agent has a tendency to keep the firm
independent, since by doing so he will continue to have access to the funds and may get
rewarded for success in the future. This tendency is stronger for the stage 1 agent due to
a larger probability of success. To induce the agent to accept an offer, the contract has to
specify a severance payment no less than the agent’s continuation value after the offer is
rejected. In an optimal contract, in addition to the termination time of financing and the
reward scheme for success, severance payments are specified contingent on sale prices so
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that certain offers will be accepted.5 In each period there is a pair of price cutoffs for the
stage 0 and 1 agents such that the agent accepts an offer if and only if the offer is higher
than the corresponding cutoff. Since the continuation value for the stage 1 agent is higher,
his cutoff price for acceptance is also higher.
I show that the possibility of acquisitions incurs additional cost to incentivize inno-
vation. If the agent always shirks from the beginning, not only does he consume funds
financed by the principal, but there is also a chance that a high enough acquisition offer ar-
rives such that the company should be sold no matter it is at stage 0 or stage 1. In that case,
the stage 0 agent receives a severance pay equal to what the stage 1 agent would receive,
which is higher than his continuation value for keeping the company unsold. Therefore,
the agent receives a acquisition rent, and his value from always shirking is higher than
without acquisition offers. To induce effort, the principal needs to provide higher rewards
for success.
The increased incentive cost due to potential buyers has an impact on the company
sale decisions induced by the optimal contract. In the case without agency problem, an
offer should be accepted if and only if it is higher than the continuation surplus to be
generated when the company is not sold in that period. However, because of the moral
hazard problem, acquisition rent arises due to the possibility that the stage 0 agent may get
the stage 1 agent’s continuation value when the stage 1 company is sold. In order to reduce
5The use of severance pay to induce the agent’s optimal use of his private information is related to work
on CEO turnover such as Laux (2008) and Inderst and Mueller (2010). They look at problems in which the
CEO has private information about the profitability of the firm under his management, and severance pay
may be used together with a steep incentive pay to induce low types of CEO to reveal his information and
to leave the firm.
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the incentive cost and the agent’s acquisition rent, the principal would like to reduce the
likelihood that the stage 1 company is sold, and the cutoff offer for the stage 1 company
is higher than the continuation surplus after rejecting the offer. Selling only the stage 0
company does not affect the agent’s payoff, and thus the cutoff offer for stage 0 is equal to
the continuation surplus of the project. In other words, the company with more progress
is only sold at a premium over its value if kept independent. I call this premium the
moral hazard premium. This result suggests that the moral hazard and the agent’s private
information about the innovation progress may together aggravate the lemon problem in
the market for startups.
Finally, the possibility of acquisitions will also affect the principal’s optimal amount
of financing. On the one hand, it is more costly to induce one more period of investment
due to the acquisition rent; on the other hand, the benefit of financing investment for one
more period is smaller, because it is possible that the company has already been sold off
and there is no need for the additional investment. As a result, the total investment will
be less than when there are no buyers.
1.2 Literature
The closest paper to this thesis is a contemporaneous work by Green and Taylor (2014).
They study a continuous time model with no discounting where (as here) the success of
a project takes two breakthroughs. The key difference between their model and mine is
that Green and Taylor assume there is an efficiency loss when the agent diverts funds
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financed by the principal while in my model the agent can divert funds efficiently. In their
case, even without a public randomizing device, it is no longer without loss generality
to only consider contracts with no reports, and they focus on the role of communication
between the principal and the agent. My model allows me to have the optimal contract in a
simpler form and to highlight the insights we obtain by introducing unobserved progress:
efficiency from ignorance and rewards for later success. Moreover, without the need
to consider communication and randomization, we can extend the model to study more
complex applications such as the financing of startups with arriving acquisition offers.
This thesis contributes to the literature on agency problems in innovation and exper-
imentation. Bergemann and Hege (1998), Bergemann and Hege (2005) and Hörner and
Samuelson (2013) study experimentation models where there is an ex ante probability
that the project is of bad quality. Breakthrough happens in one shot and there is a lack
of commitment power. These papers highlight the impact of learning about the quality of
the project on the agent’s incentives to work. Halac, Liu, and Kartik (2013) look at long
term contracts for experimentations and allow for agent’s private information about his
own ability, but they do not impose limited liability on the agent. Manso (2011) looks at
a different innovation problem which consists of two periods. Apart from working and
innovating, the agent has a safe option, and he found that to motivate innovation, the in-
centive scheme needs to be tolerant with early failure. Our key novelty is to model the
innovation as a multi-step process, and it enables us to study implications of the infor-
mation asymmetry about the progress of innovation. The efficiency from ignorant result
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resonate the desirability of an arm’s-length relationship between principal and agent illus-
trated by Crémer (1995) and Bergemann and Hege (2005). In their settings, the benefit of
loose monitoring comes from lack of commitment, and arm’s-length relationship makes
threat of termination more credible. In our environment, no monitoring is socially effi-
cient under some circumstances even under full commitment.
The paper is also broadly related papers on principal-agent problems where the prof-
itability in each period depends on the value of a changing state. For example, Kwon
(2014) and DeMarzo and Sannikov (2011) look at problems where the principal and the
agent share common initial beliefs and the state evolve exogenously over time. The agent
can interfere with the principal’s learning by private deviations in effort. Garrett and Pa-
van (2012) and Garrett and Pavan (2013) consider the case where the productivity of the
agent is his own private information, and focus the mechanism design aspect.
The application of our framework on the financing of startups with randomly arrived
buyers connects with the literature on takeovers. Grossman and Hart (1980) shows that
takeovers can play a disciplinary role for the management, because the company of a
manager with poor performance may get taken over. The raider profits from the takeover
and incumbent manager loses his job. On contrary, Stein (1988) argues that if stockhold-
ers are imperfectly informed, the takeover threat will lead to managerial myopia, but the
conclusion is reached with the assumption of no agency problem. This result is often
used as a justification for entrenchment. But our result shows that the principal’s lack of
information on innovation progress and the entrenchment of the agent together cause the
12
takeover rent, and investment level will decrease, which is more inefficient.
Finally, the use of severance pay to induce agent’s private information is related to
work on CEO turnover such as Laux (2008) and Inderst and Mueller (2010).
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Chapter 2
Baseline
2.1 Model
A principal (she) hires an agent (he) to work on an innovation project. Time is discrete
t = 0,1,2, ...,•. The principal and the agent share a common discount factor d 2 (0,1]
and are both risk neutral. There is no ex ante uncertainty about either the type of the
agent or the type of the principal. The project requires two breakthroughs to succeed.
Once successful, the project generates a positive constant flow profit per period; before
success, the profit generated is 0. The discounted value of cash flows for a successful
project is Y . I say the project or the agent is at stage n if exactly n  2 breakthroughs
have been made. In each period, if an investment is made to develop the project, then
a stage 0 project becomes stage 1 with probability q1, and a stage 1 project becomes
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stage 2 (successful) with probability q2.1 The cost of investment per period is fixed at
c > 0. Once the project is successful, no further investment is needed. The agent does
not have financial resources and must acquire funding for the investment cost from the
principal. If the agent receives the investment cost c in a period t, he can choose to make
the investment honestly for a chance of a breakthrough (denoted by at= 1), or to divert
it for his own private consumption, (at = 0).2 Alternatively, I refer to making honest
investment as working or exerting effort, and fund diversion as shirking.
Without the agency problem, the social planner’s problem is straightforward. If the
value of the successful project Y is large enough compared to the cost of investment c and
the probabilities of breakthroughs q1 and q2, the planner would like to keep on investing
until success. Otherwise, the planner will not invest at all. I assume that it is socially
efficient to invest in the project, i.e., the expected discounted value of profits from the
project is greater than the expected cost of investment. See the Appendix for the detailed
calculations.
Assumption 1 (Efficiency).
Y   [1 d +d (q1 +q2)]
dq1q2
c.
The agent observes each breakthrough and thus knows exactly the stage of the project,
1In the experimentation literature (e.g.,Hörner and Samuelson (2013)), there is an ex ante probability of
a poor quality project where investment will never lead to a breakthrough. I will discuss the implication of
it in Section 3.2.
2It makes no difference if we allow the agent to invest a portion of the investment funds and divert the
rest, as long as the breakthrough probability is linear in the portion of funds invested.
15
but the principal observes the final success. At any time t, there are two kinds of con-
tractible histories: either the success has not occurred by time t, or the success happened
in some period t 0 < t. The agent cannot make reports about the progress to the principal.
In section A.1, I show that this restriction on the space of contracts is without loss of
generality as long as there is no public randomizing device in the sense that contracting
on reports cannot improve the principal’s payoff in an optimal contract. If a public ran-
domizing device is available and reports are contractible, then the principal can indeed
obtain a higher payoff.
Ex ante, the principal and the agent can commit to a long-term contract that speci-
fies in each period the funding decision (whether the principal advances the investment
cost c to the agent) and an additional payment, contingent on contractible histories. The
agent has limited liability: all payments must be non-negative. The principal’s payoff is
the (discounted) total profits from the project minus payments to the agent and invest-
ment costs transferred, whereas the agent’s payoff is the value of total funds diverted plus
payments received.
2.2 Optimal Contracts
I begin by defining a class of contracts that I call cutoff contracts.
Definition 1. A contract is a cutoff contract if there exists some T > 0 such that the agent
is financed with the investment cost if and only if t  T .
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In cutoff contracts, the agent is financed until some termination date T , and there is no
delay of financing. I first restrict attention to the class of cutoff contracts. Proposition 2
characterizes the optimal cutoff contract given a fixed termination date T , and Proposition
3 characterizes the optimal termination date. Then in Proposition 4, it is shown that
the restriction to cutoff contracts is without loss of generality. The proof consists of
two parts. First, it can be shown that conditional on a deterministic financing strategy,
it is suboptimal to delay financing. Loosely speaking, if the continued financing after
suspension is profitable for the principal, then he would rather not delay financing so that
he can collect the profits earlier; if the continued financing is not profitable, then he is
better off by terminating financing instead of delaying it. Second, we need to show that
randomized financing strategy cannot improve the principal’s payoff.
The lemma below helps further restrict the set of contracts that need to be considered.
Lemma 1. In an optimal contract, the agent receives a positive payment (apart from the
investment cost) only when success occurs.
Intuitively, unconditional payments to the agent do not help providing incentives to
work. An unconditional payment in some period can be replaced by some payment con-
ditional on success such that the agent’s incentives will still be satisfied, but the total
expected payment to the agent is smaller.
I now focus on contracts that consist of two components: i) a termination time of
investment T ; ii) a reward schedule w = {wt}Tt=0 that specifies a payment wt if the success
occurs in period t.
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Denote the agent working (shirking) at stage n in period t by ant = 1 (ant = 0). Take
any contract (T,w). For any sequence of actions of the agent a = {ant }, a probability
distribution PT,a is induced over the time of the first breakthrough and the time of final
success t⇤. Let nt be the stage of the project in period t. If success does occur, i.e., t⇤  T ,
the ex post payoffs of the principal (u) and the agent (v), and the total surplus (p) are
given by
u = d t
⇤
(Y  wt⇤) 
1 d t⇤+1
1 d c;
v = d t
⇤
wt⇤ +
t⇤
Â
t=0
d t(1 antt )c;
p = d t
⇤
Y  
t⇤
Â
t=0
d tantt c.
If success does not occur, then
u = 1 d
T
1 d c;
v =
T
Â
t=0
d t(1 antt )c;
p = 
t⇤
Â
t=0
d tantt c.
The corresponding ex ante values U , V , P are calculated by taking expectations with
respect to PT,a.
In principle, the agent’s strategy depends not only on calendar time t and whether the
intermediate breakthrough has occurred n 2 {0,1}, but also on his entire private history
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including his past actions and when the intermediate breakthrough occurred. He may also
choose a mixed strategy. Nevertheless, the probability distribution PT,a over the time of
breakthroughs is uniquely pinned down by the termination date T and the realized choice
of actions of the agent a = {ant }. Similarly, the total surplus P is determined by T and
a = {ant }, with the additional terms of the contract of the rewards w determining the
agent’s payoff V and the principal’s payoff U .
The contract maximizes the principal’s ex ante payoff U . Formally, it solves the fol-
lowing problem
max
T,a,w
U(a,w,T ) = EPT,au
s.t. V (a,w,T ) V (a0,w,T ), 8a0 (IC)
wt   0, 8t. (LL)
The design of optimal contracts must address the following questions:
1. What are the proper incentives to provide to the agents with different levels of
progress, or in other words, should an agent at stage n in period t be induced to
work or not?
2. Is it possible to provide those incentives using only rewards for success and threat
of termination without knowing the agent’s progress?
3. What is the least costly way to provide those incentives?
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The principal’s ex ante payoff is a complicated function of T , a and w. Moreover, the
reward schedule and the termination date have to satisfy the IC constraint that consists a
set of inequalities. Rather than solving the principal’s problem directly, it is more conve-
nient to look at the problem from another angle. Since the principal and the agent share
the same discount factor, U =P V . Given termination time T , the induced action profile
a determines the total surplus of the project P. The reward schedule w has to make the
induced a incentive compatible for the agent. The agent will receive an expected payoff
V , and this measures the principal’s cost of providing incentives. In general, a tradeoff
would be expected between the social surplus and the cost of providing incentives. A
more socially efficient action profile may also be more costly to induce. However, in this
model it turns out that given T the socially optimal action profile â is no more costly to
induce than others. More specifically, define V (T ) = c(1 d T+1)/(1 d ). This is the ex
ante payoff that the agent can receive if he always shirks and diverts funds, and is a lower
bound for the incentive cost for all action profiles. It turns out that the efficient â can be
induced at a cost of V (T ).
In the remainder of this section, I characterize the optimal contract through the fol-
lowing steps. To start, I look for the optimal cutoff contract for fixed termination time T .
To do that, I first solve for the action profile â that maximizes the total surplus P. Next,
I show that there indeed exists a reward schedule w that induces â and gives the agent a
payoff of V (T ). Therefore, (â,w) maximizes the principal’s payoff U given T because
it simultaneously maximizes P and minimizes V over all possible incentive compatible
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(a0,w0). Then, I solve for the optimal termination time T ⇤. Finally, I show that the optimal
cutoff contract is also optimal among all contracts.
2.2.1 Fixed T
2.2.1.1 Efficient Actions
Given Assumption 1, if the project is at stage 1 and has only one breakthrough to be
made, then it is socially optimal for the agent to work instead of shirking for all t  T .
So â1t = 1 for all t  T . However, if the player is at stage 0, then as time moves closer
to the termination time T , working becomes suboptimal compared to shirking. This is
because when it is closer to the termination time, there is less and less chance to make
two breakthroughs that are necessary for success, and the expected return from investment
becomes smaller than the cost of investment. Therefore, it is socially more efficient to let
the agent divert the funds for private consumption. In particular, if the stage is 0 in period
T , then there is no chance to succeed because only one breakthrough is possible per
period. It is therefore more efficient for the agent to consume the fund rather than invest
it for no return.
Use Pnt to denote the maximum social surplus available if the project is at stage n at
the beginning of period t given termination time T . First note that
P2t = Y,8t; PnT+1 = 0,8n < 2.
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At stage 1, working is always efficient. Therefore, the social surplus at stage 1 is
characterized recursively by
P1t = q2Y +d (1 q2)P1t+1   c,
with boundary condition P1T+1 = 0. Solving the recursive equation gives us
P1t =
q2Y   c
1 d (1 q2)
(1  [d (1 q2)]T t+1). (2.1)
In period t at stage 0,
P0t = max{d (q1P1t+1 +(1 q1)P0t+1)  c| {z }
Working
, dP0t+1| {z }
Shirking
}.
Working is efficient if and only if
P1t+1  P0t+1  
c
dq1
. (2.2)
At stage 0, in period T it is efficient to shirk, because it is impossible to achieve
success; or we can also see it by condition (2.2): P1T+1  P0T+1 = 0 <
c
dq1 . So P
0
T = 0.
Check condition (2.2) again for period T  1: if
P1T  P0T = (q2Y   c) 0 >
c
dq1
,
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then it is efficient to work in period T  1, and
P0T 1 = d (q1P1T +(1 q1)P0T )  c;
otherwise, it is still efficient to shirk, and
P0T 1 = dP0T = 0.
As we go back in time, as long as it is efficient to shirk at stage 0 in period t, P0t stays at 0.
On the other hand, from equation (2.1), we can see that P1t becomes larger as t becomes
smaller. Define
t0 = max{t : P1t+1  
c
dq1
}, (2.3)
where P1t is determined by equation (2.1). Then t0 is the last period in which condition
(2.2) holds, i.e., the last period in which it is efficient to work if the stage is 0. It is shown
in the proof to proposition 1 that for t  t0, it is always efficient to work at stage 0, and
the total surplus functions satisfy
P0t = d (q1P1t+1 +(1 q1)P0t+1)  c. (2.4)
The following proposition summarizes the results above. See Figure 2.1 for an illus-
tration.
Proposition 1. For given T , let t0 be defined by (2.3) and (2.1).
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Figure 2.1: Total surplus function Pnt
(Y = 60,q1 = q2 = 0.1,c = 1,d = 0.99,T = 20)
1) It is socially efficient to work at stage 1 for all t  T ; it is socially efficient to work at
stage 0 if and only if t  0.
2) At stage 1, the social surplus of the project P1t is characterized by (2.1). At stage 0,
the social surplus P0t equals 0 for t > t0; for t < t0, P0t is characterized by (2.4).
2.2.1.2 Values and Rewards
Now that we have determined the socially optimal action choices are â1t = 1 for all t and
â0t = 1 if and only if t  t0, we will show that there exists a reward schedule w = {wt}
that induces â from the agent, while giving the agent a payoff of V .
Given termination time T , let V nt denote the agent’s value at stage n in period t under
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a contract that induces the socially optimal action profile â characterized in proposition
1. The agent’s ex ante payoff is V = V 00 . The agent’s value in any period only depends
on the stage of the project n 2 {0,1} and his future actions. The agent’s IC constraint is
equivalent to a set of one-shot IC conditions at both stage 0 and 1 in all periods. At stage
0, the agent’s value function follows
V 0t = max{d (q1V 1t+1 +(1 q1)V 0t+1)| {z }
Value from working
, c+dV 0t+1| {z }
Value from shirking
}, 8t = 0, ...,T
It is optimal for him to work if and only if
V 1t+1  V 0t+1  
c
dq1
.
So the one-shot IC conditions for the stage 0 agent are
V 1t+1  V 0t+1  
c
dq1
, 8t  t0;
V 1t+1  V 0t+1 
c
dq1
, 8t > t0.
Stage 0 agent’s value function satisfies
V 0t = d (q1V 1t+1 +(1 q1)V 0t+1)  c+dV 0t+1,8t  t0;
V 0t = c+dV 0t+1,8t > t0.
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To minimize the agent’s ex ante payoff V =V 00 , we need to make the IC constraint binding
for all t  t0, so that his payoff is the same no matter whether he works or shirks. For
t > t0, his IC constraints are not satisfied, and shirking is optimal. Then his ex ante payoff
V is exactly equal to the payoff he can receive if he always shirks:
V =V 00 = c+dV 01 = · · ·= c
T
Â
t=0
d t =V ,
and stage 0 agent’s payoff at any t  T is
V 0t = c
T t
Â
i=0
d i.
Next we solve for the agent’s value function at stage 1. First for t  t0+1, the binding
IC constraints at stage 0 for t  t0 pins down V 1t :
d (q1V 1t +(1 q1)V 0t ) = c+dV 0t ,
or
V 1t =V
0
t +
c
dq1
.
Note that for any t  t0, if stage 0 agent’s IC constraints are binding, then IC constraints
for stage 1 agent are automatically satisfied and stage 1 agent has a strict incentive to work
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for any d 2 (0,1):
V 1t  dV 1t+1 = (V 0t +
c
dq1
)  (dV 0t+1 +
c
q1
) = c+(1 d ) c
dq1
> c.
For t > t0+1, we need V 1t V 0t + cdq1 so that stage 0 agent has incentive to shirk in t > t0.
Also, it is necessary that V 1t 1   c+ dV 1t so that the IC constraints for stage 1 agent are
satisfied for t   t0 + 1. But optimality does not pin down the value function of stage 1
agent for t > t0 +1, and value functions V 0t and V 1t are consistent with optimal contracts
as long as the above conditions are satisfied.
Given any {V 1t }Tt=1 and V 1T+1 = 0, the reward schedule {wt} can be derived from the
recursive equations of the agent’s value at stage 1:
V 1t = q2wt +d (1 q2)V 1t+1,
or
wt = dV 1t+1 +
1
q2
(V 1t  dV 1t+1),8t = 1, ...,T.
Note that stage 1 agent’s IC conditions V 1t 1   c+ dV 1t automatically imply the limited
liability constraints wt   0.
The following proposition summarizes properties of the optimal contracts given ter-
mination time T .
Proposition 2. Let t0 be the last period that it socially efficient for stage 0 agent to work.
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An action profile a, a reward schedule w and the agent’s value function V nt are consistent
with an optimal cutoff contract if and only if the following holds:
1) a0t = 1 if and only if t  t0; a1t = 1, 8t  T .
2) For all t > T , V nt = 0, n = 0,1.
At stage 0,
V 0t = c
T t
Â
i=0
d i, 8t  T.
At stage 1, for all t 2 [1, t0 +1],
V 1t =V
0
t +
c
dq1
= c
 
T t
Â
i=0
d i + 1
dq1
!
;
for all t 2 (t0 +1,T ], V 1t satisfies
(a) V 1t V 0t + cdq1 : No incentive to work for stage 0 agent;
(b) V 1t 1   c+dV 1t : IC conditions for stage 1 agent;
3) For all t 2 [1,T ], wt satisfies
wt = dV 1t+1 +
1
q2
(V 1t  dV 1t+1).
In particular, 8t 2 [1, t0],
wt = c
 
T t
Â
i=1
d i + 1
q1
+
1
q2
+
1 d
dq1q2
!
.
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In an optimal contract, the agent’s induced actions a maximizes the total surplus and is
generically unique. Stage 0 agent’s value function V 0t is also unique for all t. It is equal to
the discounted value of future transfers of investment cost. We can uniquely determined
V 1t for t  t0 +1 and wt for t  t0, which are also strictly decreasing.
There are multiple values of V 1t for t > t0 +1 and multiple values of wt for t > t0 that
are consistent with optimal contracts. This is because optimality only requires minimizing
the ex ante value of the agent. Given an optimal contract, suppose we increase the reward
in some t > t0 but decrease the reward in another t 0 > t0. Since the IC conditions for agents
at either stage do not bind in general, the incentive to work (or shirk) for stage 1 (or 0)
agent will still hold. So as long as the perturbation generates the same value for stage 1
agent in period t0 +1, then all incentives for t  t0 will not be affected and the agent’s ex
ante payoff remains the same. The perturbed contract is still optimal. Next, we show two
examples of optimal contracts with different V 1t and wt for t   t0. In one example, stage
1 agent’s value V 1t is maximized for t > t0 +1 while in the other V 1t is minimized.
Example 1. (Figure 2.2) Set V 1t = V 0t + c/dq1 for t > t0 + 1. Therefore, stage 0 agent
is still indifferent between working and shirking for t > t0 but chooses to shirk. Stage 1
agent has a strict incentive to work in every period. Then
wt = c
 
T t
Â
i=1
d i + 1
q1
+
1
q2
+
1 d
dq1q2
!
,8t 2 [1,T  1]; wT =
c
q2
✓
1+
1
dq1
◆
.
wt is strictly decreasing except possibly in the last period.
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Figure 2.2: E.g.1: Value and reward functions
(Y = 60,q1 = q2 = 0.1,c = 1,d = 0.99,T = 20)
Example 2. (Figure 2.3) Set V 1t =V 0t for t > t0+1. In other words, we choose the reward
schedule such that stage 1 agent’s IC constraints are binding for t > t0 +1. Stage 0 agent
strictly prefers to shirk for t > t0 because the continuation value for working and shirking
are the same. The implied reward schedule is
wt =
8
>>>>>>>><
>>>>>>>>:
c
⇣
ÂT ti=1 d i +
1
q1
+ 1q2 +
1 d
dq1q2
⌘
1  t  t0
c
⇣
ÂT ti=1 d i +
1
q2
+ 1dq1q2
⌘
t = t0 +1
c
⇣
ÂT ti=1 d i +
1
q2
⌘
t0 +1 < t  T
with the summation Â0i=1(·) defined to be 0.
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(Y = 60,q1 = q2 = 0.1,c = 1,d = 0.99,T = 20)
As we can see, in the two examples, the reward wt’s are different for t > t0. However,
under both reward schedules, the relevant IC conditions are satisfied and the same actions
will be induced. Moreover, the agent will receive the same expected payment. Thus both
contracts are optimal.
2.2.2 Finding Optimal T
To fully characterize the optimal contracts, it remains to solve for the optimal time of
termination T . In first best scenario, T should be infinity, i.e., investment should always
be made until success. However, with the moral hazard problem, it is suboptimal to invest
infinitely because that gives the agent too many funds to divert. As we have shown in the
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previous section, for a given T , the agent’s ex ante payoff is equal to the discounted value
of the T periods’ investment costs. Suppose the contract specifies one more period of
investment, changing from T  1 to T . It leads to an increase of the agent’s payoff by d T c.
This is the marginal cost for the principal to commit to one more period of investment.
On the other hand, the marginal benefit is an increase in the probability of success of
the project. As we can see, as T increases, the marginal cost remains constant if we
ignore discounting. However, the marginal benefit diminishes, because when T goes to
infinity, with probability almost 1 success can occur before T . Increasing investment for
one more period will hardly increase the overall probability of success. Then the optimal
termination time T is the last period that the marginal benefit of investment is larger than
the marginal cost.
Define
Q01(t) = (1 q1)t ;
Q02(t) = (1 q2)t ;
Q1(t) =
t 1
Â
i=0
(1 q1)iq1(1 q2)t i.
So Q01(t) is the probability that the first breakthrough does not occur within t periods;
Q(02)(t) is the probability that the second breakthrough does not occur within t periods
after the first has occurred. Q1(t) is the probability that only the first breakthrough occurs
within t periods.
We can see that Q01(t) and Q02(t) are strictly decreasing in t, and Q1(t) first increases
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and then decreases. These values converge to 0 as t goes to infinity.
Given T , let Pnt,T and V nt,T be the total surplus functions and the agent’s value functions
under optimal contracts, and let t0,T be stage 0 agent’s last working period under optimal
contracts. From how t0,T is calculated in proposition 1, we can see that for any termination
time T , T   t0,T is constant. Let t̂ = T   t0,T . This will be the number of periods of
financing after stage 0 agent stops working. So one more period of investment will induce
both stage 0 and stage 1 agent to work for one more period. Also note that the total surplus
P1t,T at stage 1 in time t when termination time is T only depends on T   t + 1, i.e., the
number of periods left for investment. Define P1(t) = P1T t+1,T to be the total surplus
when the project is at stage 1 when there are t periods of investment left. From equation
(2.1) in 2.2.1.1, we know that
P1(t) = q2Y   c
1 d (1 q2)
(1  [d (1 q2)]t).
Proposition 3. Define
T ⇤ = max
T
{T : P00,T  P00,T 1   d T c}3,
where
P00,T  P00,T 1 = Q1(t0,T )Q02(t̂)d T (dq2Y   c)+Q01(t0,T )d t0,T (dq1P1(t̂)  c).
3The set is non-empty by Assumption 1.
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Then T ⇤ > 0 is the termination time in the optimal cutoff contract.
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Figure 2.4: Finding opitmal termination T ⇤
(Y = 50,q1 = q2 = 0.15,c = 1,d = 0.99,T ⇤ = 17)
Figure 2.4 illustrates how to determine the optimal termination time. As T increases,
the difference between the ex ante total surplus and the agent’s payoff P00,T  V 00,T first
increases and then decreases. The optimal T ⇤ is where the gap is the largest if the differ-
ence is ever positive. If P00,T  V 00,T is always negative, then the project is not profitable
to finance for the principal.
Proposition 4. Conditional on the optimal cutoff contract yields non-negative payoff to
the principal, the optimal cutoff contract is also optimal in unrestricted class of contracts.
Otherwise, the optimal contract specifies no financing at all.
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2.3 Implications of Unobserved Progress
In this section, I discuss in more detail the properties of optimal contracts characterized
in section 2.2. Comparing the results to models where the progress is observable and
contractible, or where only one breakthrough is required for success (so that the progress
of innovation is not modeled), I highlight the implications of progress being unobservable
to the principal on incentives and on the contract structure.
2.3.1 Efficiency from Ignorance
From section 2.2, we already know that fixing the termination time T , profit-maximizing
contracts for the principal actually induce actions from the agent that maximize the total
surplus. However, the optimal termination time T ⇤ is not efficient because first best will
require always investing until success. But if there is a binding exogenous deadline T̃ 
T ⇤ for innovation due to either time or budget constraint such that investment cannot be
made after T̄ , then the optimal contract is socially efficient.
This efficiency result is precisely because progress is unobservable, and we will call it
efficiency from ignorance. Since the agent with no progress cannot be distinguished from
the one with some progress, he will continue collect the rent from diverting the funds
when he is supposed to shirk in t > t0. Therefore, it does not help providing incentives to
choose a earlier stopping time of working for the stage 0 agent. Given the final investment
termination time T , the agent is always guaranteed a payoff of V from always shirking.
As a result, the best that the principal can do is to induce actions from the agent that
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maximize the total surplus.
This will not be the case when progress is observable and contractible. In that envi-
ronment, the agent’s value is no longer independent of the stopping time of investment at
stage 0 because the principal can observe whether the first breakthrough has occurred or
not. If the principal wants stage 0 agent to stop working after some period t̃0, but wants
stage 1 agent to continue working until T , she can do so simply by stopping financing the
project if the stage is still 0 after t̃0. The smaller t̃0 is, the less money he can divert by
always shirking. In other words, earlier termination t̃0 provides more incentive for stage
0 agent to work. Less reward is needed upon success, and inducing working becomes
cheaper. As a result, given the termination time T , the principal may be better off by
choosing a t̃0 that is smaller than the socially efficient t0, although it reduces the total
possible surplus.
Proposition 5. Suppose the first breakthrough is observable and contractible, and there
is an exogenous deadline for innovation T  T ⇤.4 The optimal contract the following
feature: conditional on the first breakthrough does not occur, the agent is financed if and
only if t  t̃0 for some t̃0 < T .; conditional on the first breakthrough has occurred, the
agent is financed until the deadline T .
Moreover, t̃0  t0, where t0 is the efficient stopping time of investment for stage 0
project characterized in Proposition 1. The inequality is strict under some parameters.
It is worth noting that although, under some conditions, the outcome is less efficient
4Recall that T ⇤, as characterized by Proposition 3, is the optimal termination time of financing when the
first breakthrough is not contractible.
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when the principal can monitor and contract on the progress, she is still strictly better
off than if the progress is not contractible. She can always induce the efficient actions
and have stage 0 agent stop in period t0. Unlike the case where progress is private, she
does not need to finance the stage 0 agent after t0, and the agent’s share of the surplus
is strictly smaller. However, if the innovation project is funded by a principal that aims
to maximize social welfare, such as the government, and there is a binding deadline for
innovation, then there is an optimal contract where the principal chooses not to monitor
the progress even when monitoring is costless. Another interpretation of the result is
that, under some circumstances, the regulator in the economy may choose to impose
regulations that prevent tight monitoring of the progress of some projects, although it will
hurt the financier.
2.3.2 Non-monotone Rewards
In an optimal contract, the reward function wt is strictly decreasing in the success time
t for t  t0 + 1. This is reminiscent of the dynamic agency cost identified by Hörner
and Samuelson (2013).5 Intuitively, when success happens early, the agent loses the
opportunity to divert a large amount of fund in the future. So for him to be willing to
work for success in early periods, the agent has to be rewarded by more for earlier success.
However, as illustrated by example 1 and 2, the reward wt may jump up in some periods
5In their setting, an additional source of the dynamic agency cost is due to the uncertainty of the quality
of the project. The agent’s private belief is more optimistic than the principal’s off the equilibrium path
when he deviates to shirking, so shirking is more tempting compared to the static setting because it will
lead to larger value in the future.
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after t0, and later success can be rewarded by more.6 This possible non-monotonicity of
wt on t 2 [t0,T ] is again driven by the features that innovation takes more that one step
and that the progress is unobservable to the principal. If the success of innovation only
requires one breakthrough, and thus there is no information asymmetry about the progress
then the optimal reward will be strictly decreasing for all t  T . As a comparison, we state
the result for the case where innovation requires only one breakthrough in the following
proposition.
Proposition 6. When innovation only requires one breakthrough, the optimal contract
(w,T ) is characterized by
wt = c
 
T t
Â
i=1
d i + 1
q
!
,8t = 0, ...,T ;
and
T =
 
log1 q
c
qY   c
⌫
,
where b·c is the floor function: bxc ⌘ min{k 2 N : k  x}.
Mathematically, the reason that wt may be monotone is the following. As shown in
figure 2.2 and 2.3, V 0t decreases gradually in t and is equal to 0 when t = T + 1. For
t  t0 + 1, V 1t is strictly larger than V 0t by c/dq; but at t = T + 1, V 1t = V 0t = 0. So
between t0 +1 and T +1, stage 1 agent’s value function V 1t shifts from V 0t + c/dq down
to V 0t , and has to decrease at a higher rate than in periods t  t0. In example 1, V 1t drops
6For all parameters, there exists an optimal contract in which the rewards are non-monotone. Moreover,
there exists parameters such that all optimal contracts have non-monotone rewards.
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down at t = T + 1, and in example 2, V 1t drops at t = t0 + 2. A faster decrease of V 1t in
t corresponds to a high wt . In general, the shift can be more gradual, the the jump in wt
will be less drastic as in the two examples. See figure 2.5 for an example.
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Figure 2.5: E.g.3: Value and reward functions
(Y = 60,q1 = q2 = 0.1,c = 1,d = 0.99,T = 20)
The result of non-monotone rewards can also be interpreted from the perspective of
capital structure implementation. In the one-breakthrough case, the decreasing reward
function wt = c
 
ÂT ti=1 d i +1/q
 
is equivalent to the following arrangement. The principal
commits to transfer c to the agent in each period for either investment or consumption
until T , even if success has already occurred. When the project is successful, the agent
receives a fixed share of the value of success c/q and the principal gets the rest Y   c/q;
the agent consumes the rest of the transfers of c period. Since the agent can still get the
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future transfers after success, he has no incentive to delay investment. The share c/q is
the minimum reward needed for the agent to be willing to work in a static problem. The
optimal contract can be simply implemented by granting a fixed share of stock to the
agent.
One might conjecture a similar argument will hold for the two-breakthrough case.
Indeed, for t  t0,
wt = c
 
T t
Â
i=1
d i + 1
q1
+
1
q2
+
1 d
dq1q2
!
. (2.5)
The structure is similar to the one-breakthrough case, except now the fixed share granted
to the agent becomes c
⇣
ÂT ti=1 d i +
1
q1
+ 1q2 +
1 d
dq1q2
⌘
. However, if wt follows equation (2.5)
for all t  T , some of the incentive conditions for the agent will be violated. Remember
that in an optimal contract, stage 0 agent is supposed to work until t0, where t0 is the
socially efficient time to stop investing in stage 0 project when the value of success is Y .
If the agent is given c in each period until T and gets a fixed share
FS = c
 
T t
Â
i=1
d i + 1
q1
+
1
q2
+
1 d
dq1q2
!
when the project succeeds, then he will act as if he is a social planner that manages a
project that is worth FS upon success. Since FS < Y , the agent of stage 0 would like to
stop investing earlier than the efficient time t0. In order to induce stage 0 agent to invest
for longer time, the principal could increase the fixed share of the value of success granted
to the agent. But this is the suboptimal approach because this gives the agent a larger ex
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ante payoff. Instead, the optimal contract does not use a fixed share of stock. For t  t0,
the share given to the agent is c
⇣
ÂT ti=1 d i +
1
q1
+ 1q2 +
1 d
dq1q2
⌘
; in one or more periods from
t0 + 1 to T , the reward function wt jumps up, corresponding to a larger share of stock
given to the agent. This provides stage 0 agent more incentive to work for t  t0 without
giving him a larger ex ante payoff.
The result is consistent with the wide use of time-vested restricted stock units (RSU).
Usually time-vested RSU is understood as a tool to provide incentives for employees
to stay on the job. Indeed, this is its main role for workers at middle to low levels in
large companies, where individuals’ effort have little impact on the overall profitability,
and moral hazard may not be the main concern. On the other hand, this model stresses
that in contexts such as incentivizing founders of startups, time-vested stocks as part
of the compensation scheme not only help retain founders on the project, but also give
them more incentives to exert effort before the stocks vest. This extra bit of incentive is
especially important if the progress has been slow. The founder will want to work to make
more progress on the project so that his vested stocks will be more likely to be valuable.
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Chapter 3
Extensions and Discussions
3.1 Which Task First: the Easy or the Difficult?
In this section, suppose the two breakthroughs required for the success of the project do
not need to be in a particular order. In other words, there are two tasks that need to be
completed, task D(ifficult) and task E(asy). In each period, the agent can choose to work
on task D or E. If task i is worked on in a period, the probability that it is completed is
qi, with qE > qD. The costs for investing in the two tasks are the same, c. For simplicity,
assume there is no discounting, i.e., d = 1. The contractible histories remain the same as
in the baseline case. Now a contract specifies at each history a financing decision, a reward
for final success and which task to work on. There is an additional set of IC constraints
for the agent that he does not deviate to working on the other task. The question is, in the
optimal contract, which task is the agent induced to work on first.
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Again, it is helpful to consider the planner’s problem first. Given a termination time
T , if the planner works on task E first, she will exert effort up to some t0 to complete
task E. If task E is completed by t0, she will work until T on task D; otherwise she stops
working. Let P(ED) denote the social surplus when the planner works on task E first and
uses the optimal t0. Let P(DE) denote the social surplus when task D is done first and
the planner uses the same t0 that is optimal for the sequence ED.
Lemma 2.
P(DE)> P(ED).
The above lemma states that planner obtains a higher payoff by doing task D first
even she uses a dropout time t0 at stage 0 that may not be optimal. Therefore, it is always
optimal for the planner to work on the difficult task first. To see the intuition behind the
result, think about an extreme case where qE = 1 and qD < 1. If task E is carried out first,
it is immediately completed with certainty at t = 0. Thus, the choice of t0 does not matter
and it can be set to T   1. Now compare the planner’s payoffs under the following two
strategies: 1) complete task E at t = 0 and use the remaining T periods to work on D;
or 2) work on task D first for T periods from t = 0 to T   1, and if task D is completed,
do task E and succeed; otherwise do not work at t = T . Note that the two strategies
lead to the same probability of success: under both strategies, success requires task D
be completed within T periods. In fact, the two strategies result in the same distribution
over success time. Therefore, in the event of success, the payoffs of the planner are the
same. However, suppose in the unlucky event that task D is not completed within T
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periods (with probability (1  qD)T ), working on D first saves the planner one period’s
investment cost compared to working on E first. Lemma 2 proves that the intuition from
the extreme case holds in general.
Another way to interpret this result is that the continuation value of having completed
the difficult task is higher. It is not yet obvious that the difficult task should be worked on
first because the probability is lower. The proof shows that even taking into account the
lower probability, working on the difficult task still gives higher return.
The next proposition shows that working on the difficult task first is not only efficient,
but also generates higher payoff for the principal.
Proposition 7. The optimal contract induces the agent to work on task D first.
Proof. Consider best contract that induces the agent to work on task E first. It has a
termination date T and a stage 0 dropout time t0. Let U(ED) be the principal’s payoff
(U(DE) defined respectively). Then U(ED)P(ED) (T +1)c. Now suppose the agent
is restricted to do task D first. Consider the contract describe in Example 2 in Chapter 2
with the same T and t0, and q1 = qD,q2 = qE . By proposition 2,
U(DE) = P(DE)  (T +1)c.
Therefore, U(DE)>U(ED).
Lastly, it can be verified that when the wages are defined as in Example 2, the agent
indeed does not have an incentive to deviating to working on E first. Recall from Example
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2 that the reward schedule that implements DE is
wt =
8
>>>>>>>><
>>>>>>>>:
c
⇣
ÂT ti=1 d i +
1
qD +
1
qE +
1 d
dqDqE
⌘
1  t  t0
c
⇣
ÂT ti=1 d i +
1
qE +
1
dqDqD
⌘
t = t0 +1
c
⇣
ÂT ti=1 d i +
1
qE
⌘
t0 +1 < t  T
.
Stage 1 agent (the agent that has completed D) is indifferent between working and shirk-
ing for t 2 [t0 + 1,T ) and stage 0 agent is indifferent between working and shirking for
t  t0.
Consider another reward schedule
w0t =
8
>>>>>>>><
>>>>>>>>:
c
⇣
ÂT ti=1 d i +
1
qD +
1
qE +
1 d
dqDqE
⌘
1  t  t0
c
⇣
ÂT ti=1 d i +
1
qD +
1
dqDqD
⌘
t = t0 +1
c
⇣
ÂT ti=1 d i +
1
qD
⌘
t0 +1 < t  T
.
If the agent is restricted to take the sequence ED, then under {w0t}, he is exactly indifferent
between working and shirking at stage 1 for t 2 [t0 +1,T ) and at stage 0 for t  t0. Since
wt = w0t for t  t0 and wt < w0t for t > t0, if agent deviates to the sequence ED, then
after completing task E, his value V 1t is strictly smaller than the stage 1 value under {w0t}
for t  t0 + 1. Therefore at stage 0, he does not have an incenitve to work on E under
{wt}.
To sum up, there are two reasons to induce the agent to work on the difficult task
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first. First, the sequence DE yields higher total surplus than ED given any termination
time. Second, it is also cheaper to induce the agent to work on the difficult task first. By
comparing {wt} and {w0t} in the proof above, we see that wt is weakly smaller than w0t
for all t and strictly smaller for some t. It is possible to implement the efficient action
profile given sequence DE while keeping the agent’s ex ante payoff at the low bound
V = ÂTi=1 d ic, but for the sequence ED. To induce the agent to work on the easy task first,
the incentive cost is higher than V , because otherwise he would deviate to working on D
first.
3.2 Possibility of Bad Project
In this section, assume that with probability 1  g0, the project is with bad quality ex
ante, and the breakthroughs never arrive. With probability g0, the project is good and
conditional on that everything is the same as in the baseline model. The principal and
agent share the same ex ante belief about the quality of the project.
Same as the baseline model, the only publicly observable event is the final success,
so the space of contracts remains the same. Given a contract, the agent faces a decision
problem with incomplete information about the quality of the project. His private histories
include the events of breakthroughs and past effort choices. The agent updates his belief
about the quality of the project based on his private histories.
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3.2.1 Characterizing Values and Rewards
A critical variable in this environment is the agent’s belief on the project being good,
which evolves as the agent works on the project according to the following equation:
gk =
gk 1(1 q1)
gk 1(1 q1)+(1  gk 1)
.
So gk is the agent’s belief that the project is good after working but failing to complete
the first breakthrough in k periods. Once the first breakthrough occurs, the agent’s belief
jumps to 1. On the equilibrium path, the principal’s belief conditional on no breakthrough
is the same as the agent’s. However, after deviations, the agent has private beliefs that
differ from the principal’s.
Again, first consider the constrained planner’s problem given a termination time T .
At stage 1, it is known that the project is good, so the social surplus function P1t at stage
1 is the same as in the baseline model:
P1t =
q2Y   c
1 d (1 q2)
(1  [d (1 q2)]T t+1). (2.1)
Define
t⇤0 = maxt {dgtq1P
1
t+1   c}.
It is efficient to work at stage 0 up to t⇤0 , and work up to T conditional on being at stage
1. Note that compared with the base line (see equation (2.3)), T   t⇤0 is larger. That is
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to say, given the same T , the efficient time to drop out at stage 0 is earlier when there is
uncertainty about the projects quality. The value of completing the first breakthrough at
any time remains the same, but the planner is more pessimistic about the chance.
In the optimal contract, the principal induces the agent to work at stage 0 up to some
t0, and to work at stage 1 up to T . Let V 0t (g) be the agent’s value at stage 0 in period t
when his belief is g; let V 1t be the agent’s value at stage 1 in period t.
On the equilibrium path, the agent’s value function in period t at stage 0 satisfies
V 0t (gt) = d
⇥
gtq1V 1t+1 +(1  gtq1)V 0t+1(gt+1)
⇤
,8t  t0; (3.1)
V 0t (gt0+1) = c+dV
0
t+1(gt0+1),8t   t0 +1.
The IC constraints at t  t0 requires
V 0t (gt)  c+dV 0t+1(gt).
Note that attention can be restricted to IC constraints on the equilibrium path. Suppose
the IC is always satisfied on the path of the play. Then had the agent shirked in one or
more periods, his belief would be more optimistic than on the equilibrium path, and he
would be more willing to work.
The stage 0 agent is supposed to shirk in t   t0+1. In fact the contract can be designed
such that stage 0 agent prefers to shirk for t   t0 + 1 for any belief. For example, the
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rewards wt can be chosen such that V 1t = cÂT ti=0 d i for all t   t0 +2. Therefore,
V 0t (g) = c
T t
Â
i=0
d i,8t   t0 +1,8g 2 [0,1]. (3.2)
Before proceeding to solve the agent’s value function under the optimal contract, observe
that V 0t (g) is linear affine in g:
V 0t (g) = gV 0t (1)+(1  g)d t0+1 tV 0t0+1 = d
t0+1 tV 0t0+1 + g(V
0
t (1) d t0+1 tV 0t0+1).
Define V 0t (g) =V 0t (g) d t0+1 tV 0t0+1. Then
V 0t (g) = gV
0
t (1).
Optimality requires the IC constraints to be binding for all t  t0, i.e.,
V 0t (gt) = c+dV 0t+1(gt),8t  t0.
Subtracting d t0+1 tV 0t0+1 from both sides,
V 0t (gt) = c+dV
0
t+1(gt) = c+d
gt
gt+1
V 0t+1(gt+1).
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Solving it recursively with boundary condition Vt0+1(gt0+1) = 0
V 0t (gt) = c
 
t0 t
Â
i=0
d i gt
gt+i
!
.
Therefore,
V 0t (gt) = c
 
t0 t
Â
i=0
d i gt
gt+i
+
T t0
Â
i=t0 t+1
d i
!
(3.3)
The value function at stage 1 in t  t0 +1 can then be derived from equation (3.1):
V 1t =V
0
t (gt)+
V 0t 1(gt 1) dV 0t (gt)
dgt 1q1
. (3.4)
Similar to the benchmark case, there are multiple sets of V 1t values for t   t0 +2 that are
consistent with optimality. A sufficient condition is that
V 1t V 0t (1)+
c
dq1
and V 1t 1   c+dV 1t ,8t   t0 +2 (3.5)
This ensures that in t   t0+1 the agent has incentive to work at stage 1, and has incentive
to shirk at stage 0 for any belief. Finally, the reward schedule wt is derived from recursive
equation of the agent’s value at stage 1:
V 1t = q2wt +d (1 q2)V 1t+1,8t = 1,2, ...,T. (3.6)
The following proposition summarizes the properties of the value and reward functions
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in optimal contract:
Proposition 8. In the optimal contract, the principal finances the agent up to some ter-
mination time T . The stage 0 agent is induced to work up to some t0 < T ; the stage 1
agent is induced to work up to T . The agent’s value functions and the reward schedule
are characterized by equation (3.2) – (3.6).
3.2.2 Comparison with the Baseline
Recall the two key properties of the optimal contracts that are identified in the baseline
model: efficiency from ignorance and non-monotone rewards. In the environment with
the ex ante possibility of a bad project, it can be seen that the non-monotone rewards
property continues to hold. That is to say, the reward for success bumps up in at least one
of t = t0 +1, ...,T .
However, the efficiency from ignorance result no longer holds. The stopping time for
working of the stage 0 agent t0 is no longer conditionally efficient given the termination
time T . To see that, observe that the agent’s ex ante value is
V =V 00 (g0) = c
 
t0
Â
i=0
d i g0
gi
+
T
Â
i=t0 t+1
d i
!
. (3.7)
V is now strictly larger than the payoff from always shirking. The agent gains additional
rents from experimentation in the periods that he is supposed to work at stage 0: t =
0, ..., t0. This is because the agent’s private beliefs become more optimistic after deviation
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to shirking. Although on the equilibrium path the agent is always indifferent between
working and shirking, after having shirked in previous periods, he would strictly prefers
to work. Also note that unlike the baseline model, the agent’s ex ante value is no longer
independent of the choice of t0. The longer that the principal would like the stage 0 agent
to work, the more rents from experimentation she needs to give up to the agent. The
principal now faces a tradeoff: with a t0 smaller than the efficient t⇤0 , less social surplus
is generate from the project, but the principal also saves on incentive cost. Thus, in the
optimal contract, the principal does not necessarily induces the stage 0 agent to work up
to the efficient stopping time t⇤0 . In fact, in the continuous time limit, the principal always
chooses a t0 that is strictly smaller than t⇤0 . This is because near t
⇤
0 , the change on the
social surplus is of second order, while the save on incentive cost is of first order.
Proposition 9. Given any termination time T , t0  t⇤0 , and there exists parameter values
such that the inequality is strict.
Lastly, I compare the optimal termination time T ⇤ when there is uncertainty about the
project quality with the optimal termination T ⇤BL in the baseline case.
Proposition 10.
T ⇤  T ⇤BL.
It is not very surprising that with uncertainty of the project quality, the total financing
is less. Loosely speaking, the marginal benefit of increasing T by one more period is that
if the project is at stage 1 after T , there is one more period to try to complete it. However,
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with uncertainty of the project’s quality, the probability that only the first breakthrough
occurs by time T is smaller. There are two reasons for this. First, there is a chance that
breakthrough never come, and second, t0  t⇤0 so that less time is allowed to complete
the first breakthrough. At the same time, the marginal cost of increasing T , which is
the increased agent’s ex ante payoff is at least the same as the baseline case. Therefore,
the principal would like to decrease the total level of financing when there is uncertainty
about the project’s quality.
3.3 Noisy Signals of the Progress
In this section, assume that when the project is at stage 1 and if the agent is financed,1
then at the beginning of a period, a signal arrives publicly with probability k , independent
over time. At stage 0, no signal is received. Moreover, in this section, it is assume that
there is a time constraint T  T ⇤, where T ⇤ is the optimal termination time in the baseline
model. For simplicity, it is assumed that d = 1.
Now a public history includes not only the event of success, but also the histories of
signals. Once one signal arrives, the project is publicly revealed to be at stage 1. Thus
future signals no longer matter. There are four kinds of public histories: a history that
success has occurred without any signal received, a history that success has occurred after
1The reason to assume signals are only available when the agent is financed is that otherwise, the princi-
pal can delay financing for arbitarily long and wait for signals over time. If the principal is patient enough,
it is almost as if the principal can perfectly observe the progress. But the behavior of waiting to verify the
progress is not very realistic and is not the purpose of this excercise. This additional assumption eliminates
the desirability to delay financing and wait for signals.
53
a signal was received, a history that success has not occurred but the first breakthrough
has been revealed, and a history without success and signals. A contract again maps a
public history to a financing decision and a payment to the agent.
The agent’s private histories include the event of the first breakthrough and his past
actions in addition to the public histories. Before the final success, there are now three
possible states, publicly known stage 1, private stage 1, and stage 0. Let P1t , P̂1t and P0t
denote the social surplus conditional on the contract at the three states respectively, and
let V 1t , V̂ 1t and V 1t be the respective value functions.
Given any T , the principal again finances the agent and induces him to work up to T if
the project has been confirmed to be stage 1 by some signal. If no signal has arrived, the
principal finances the agent up to some tG  T ; the stage 1 agent is induced to work up
to tG and the stage 0 agent is induced to work up to some t0 < tG. Also, now the reward
schedule not only can be a function of the success time, but also may depend on whether
the signal has arrived. Let wt denote the reward paid to the agent for success at time t if
the signal has arrived, and let ŵt be the reward for success before the signal arrives.
P1t follows the same recursive equations as in the baseline model:
P1t = q2Y +(1 q2)P1t+1   c,8t.
Thus
P1t =
✓
Y   c
q2
◆ 
1  (1 q2)T t+1
 
.
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Same as the baseline model, the efficient time to stop working on a stage 0 project is
defined by
t⇤0 = max{t : P1t+1  
c
q1
}.
When the stage is 1 but not yet observed by the principal, the social surplus function
satisfies
P̂1t = kP1t +(1 k)P̂1t+1,8t  tG,
and
P̂1t = 0,8t > tG.
At stage 0,
P0t = q1P̂1t+1 +(1 q1)P0t+1,8t  t0,
and
P0t = 0,8t > t0.
The agent’s value function at stage 0 satisfies
V 0t = q1V̂
1
t+1 +(1 q1)V 0t+1   c+V 0t+1,8t  t0;
V 0t = c+V
0
t+1,8t 2 (t0, tG];
V 0t = 0,8t > tG. (3.8)
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At stage 1 before the signal arrives,
V̂ 1t =kV 1t +(1 k)q2ŵt +(1 k)(1 q2)V̂ 1t+1
 kV 1t +(1 k)(c+V̂ 1t+1), 8t  tG;
V̂ 1t = 0,8t > tG.
(3.9)
At stage 1 after the signal arrives,
V 1t = q2wt +(1 q2)V 1t+1,8t. (3.10)
Similar to the environment with observable progress, given termination time T , the
stage 0 agent’s IC constraints may not be binding. There are two cases to consider.
Lemma 3. If q2k(T   tG)c < c, then t0  tG, and the IC constraints are binding for t  t0
at stage 0. If q2k(T  tG)c   c, then t0 = tG, and stage 0 agent’s IC do not bind for t < tG.
Case 1
Suppose the IC constraints are binding at stage 0 for t  t0,
V 0t = c(tG   t +1),8t  tG, (3.11)
and
V̂ 1t = c
✓
tG   t +1+
1
q
◆
,8t  t0 +1. (3.12)
The values of V̂ 1t for t0 +2  t  tG +1 are not unique: they are consistent with optimal
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contracts as long as stage 0 agent has incentives to shirk and unconfirmed stage 1 agent
has incentives to work:
(q1V̂ 1t+1 +(1 q1)V 0t+1) c+V 0t+1,
V̂ 1t   kV 1t +(1 k)(c+V̂ 1t+1), 8t 2 [t0 +1, tG].
(3.13)
Without loss of generality, the IC constraint at stage 1 before signals arrive can (but not
need to) be set to binding, i.e., inequality in (3.9) holding with equality. This would pin
down ŵt and V 1t for t  t0 +1:
ŵt = V̂ 1t +
c
q
; (3.14)
V 1t = V̂
1
t + c. (3.15)
Again, the values of V 1t and wt are not unique.
Proposition 11. Given T , tG and t0, if q2k(T   tG)c < c, then the value functions and
reward functions in the optimal contracts are characterized by (3.8) – (3.13).
Although the values and rewards in optimal contracts are not unique, but they all lead
to the same ex ante payoff for the agent.
Proposition 12. Given T and tG, if q2k(T   tG)c < c, then t0 is characterized by
t0 = max{t : P̂1t+1  
c
q1
}.
57
Proof. Given tG, the agent’s ex ante value is fixed when the stage 0 IC are always binding.
Therefore, t0 should be chosen to maximize the total surplus. If P̂1t+1  
c
q1
, but the agent
is induced to shirk at stage 0. Then the surplus is not maximized by working in t and shirk
afterwards,
P0t = q1P̂1t+1   c,
while by starting to shirk the surplus is 0. Conversely, if P̂1t+1 <
c
q1
and the agent works
in period t at stage 0, then the surplus is negative, which is suboptimal.
Case 2
Suppose q2k(T   tG)   c. Then at tG, the agent at stage 0 has an incentive to work
as long as he is promised to be financed till T if he becomes stage 1 and a signal arrives
at tG + 1. Moreover, this will be true not only at tG but at all t  tG. Then to minimize
the agent’s value, the continuation contract after a signal arrives at time t is the same as
the one breakthrough case described in proposition 6, and the agent’s continuation value
is equal to c(T   t):
wt = c
✓
T   t + 1
q
◆
(3.16)
V 1t = c(T   t). (3.17)
The value function V̂ t1 still satisfies (3.9). Moreover, to minimize the agent’s ex ante
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value, the inequality should hold with equality:
V̂ 1t =kV 1t +(1 k)q2ŵt +(1 k)(1 q2)V̂ 1t+1
=kV 1t +(1 k)(c+V̂ 1t+1), 8t  tG;
V̂ 1t =0,8t > tG.
(3.18)
This pins down V̂ 1t and ŵt .
Finally, V 0t is characterized by
V 0t = q1V̂
1
t+1 +(1 q1)V 0t+1,8t  tG
V 0t = 0,8t > tG.
(3.19)
Proposition 13. Given T , tG and t0, if q2k(T   tG)c   c, then the value functions and
reward functions in the optimal contracts are characterized by (3.16) – (3.19).
Now that the optimal contracts have been characterized in both cases, binding or non-
binding IC at stage 0, next I show that the optimal contract with imperfect signals is the
same as the fully observable progress case when the signal is very informative. The result
is true irrespective of whether the IC constraints are binding or not at stage 0. Similarly,
when the signal is very uninformative, the optimal contract is the same as the situation
with no signals at all, wherein the IC constraints are binding at stage 0.
Given T ( T ⇤), let tBL0 be the stage 0 agent’s stopping time in the baseline model, and
let t̃0 be the stage 0 stopping time in the fully observed progress case.
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Proposition 14. There exists k and k such that: 1) if k > k , then tG = t0 = t̃0; 2) if k < k ,
then tG = T , t0 = tBL0 .
The above proposition confirms that the original baseline model is robust to small
perturbation with respect to the principal’s ability to observe the progress of the project.
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Chapter 4
Application: Acquisition Offers
In this chapter, I extend the model to study the problem of financing of an innovative
startup company whereas buyers randomly arrive and make offers to acquire the company.
The founder (the agent) of a startup company aims to develop a new product, and the
venture capitalist (VC, the principal) finances the founder the cost of R & D. Startup
companies attract acquisition offers from time to time, and whether to “get bought” or
“get big” is a critical decision to make. Typically, the founder is better informed about the
innovation progress, and thus possesses private information of the company’s value if kept
independent. The VC would like the founder to use his private information appropriately
to make better decisions responding to acquisition offers, but their interests in general
do not align. For him to be willing to accept an offer, the founder has to be sufficiently
compensated by the contract for losing the opportunity to manage the company and be
rewarded for a possible success. However, the terms of contracts regarding acquisitions
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in turn affects the founder’s incentive to work at the first place. In this section, I examine
how the potential acquisition interacts with the moral hazard problem in innovation, and
study how it affects the principal’s financing decisions.
The problem of financing startups with randomly arrived buyers relates to the litera-
ture on takeovers. Grossman and Hart (1980) shows that takeovers can play a disciplinary
role for the management, because the company of a manager with poor performance may
get taken over. The raider profits from the takeover and incumbent manager loses his job.
On the contrary, Stein (1988) argues that if stockholders are imperfectly informed, the
takeover threat will lead to managerial myopia; but this conclusion is reached with the
assumption of no agency problem. This result is often used as a justification for entrench-
ment. In this section, I will show that the principal’s lack of information on innovation
progress and the entrenchment of the agent together lead to increase in the cost of incen-
tivizing the agent. Consequently, total financing decreases due to potential acquisitions,
which is less efficient.
Consider the same environment as described in Chapter 2. It requires two break-
throughs for the product to be successfully developed, and there is a moral hazard problem
that the founder may divert the investment for private consumption. Only final success
is observable to the investor. For notational convenience, assume q1 = q2 = q. In addi-
tion, assume that at the beginning of each period t, there is a probability l that there is a
buyer that arrives and makes an offer pt to acquire the startup. I assume that buyers are
non-strategic and pt = z+1{nt = 2}Y , where z is a random variable that follows some
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distribution G(·) with density g(·) and support [0,•).1 The part z in the offer reflects
the part of the buyer’s valuation for the startup that does not rely on the success of the
project. For example, it could be for the expertise of the research team that the startup has
built, or for some existing patent or product that is valuable to the buyer. It could even be
for the benefit of eliminating a potential competitor. In addition, if the project has been
successful, the acquisition offer will take into account the value of the future cash flows
Y . The arrivals and values of acquisition offers are independent across periods. Upon re-
ceiving the acquisition offer, the agent (the founder of the startup) chooses whether or not
to sell the company. The agent may receive payment from the principal upon selling the
company, and again the payment has to be non-negative. Afterward, the agent receives 0
continuation value.
I take as exogenous that the agent has the control right. This is typically the case
for startup companies in technology industry nowadays, especially for firms at a younger
age. In corporations, various forms of anti-takeover defense are used widely such that
it is often very difficult for outsiders to acquire a company without the consent of the
incumbent management. While it is interesting to study the optimal allocation of control
right, this is a complex problem affected by many factors, many of which are not the focus
of this paper. Given founder control and takeover defense are the prevailing practices, my
goal is to highlight the impact of the unobserved progress of innovation on the principal-
agent problem when there are potential buyers interested in take over the company.
1The results are not driven by the offers being non-strategic. In subsection 4.4, I will discuss the impli-
cation of strategic offers.
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With potential buyers, in addition to the final success, the principal now can also ob-
serve offers made by arrived buyers and whether the agent accepts an offer or not. I
assume that besides the date of success, the principal and the agent can contract the date
and the price of the sale of the company, but (dates and prices of) the rejected offers are
not contractible. There are two reasons for this assumption. First, communication of of-
fers is often informal and thus difficult to verify and contract on. Indeed, it is uncommon
that terms in a contract are contingent on an offer of some price being rejected at some
date. In contrast, payments made contingent on an accepted offer are very common, and
can be easily implemented by equity and severance packages. Second, if the contractual
terms are contingent on some offer being rejected, then potentially the agent may have
an incentive to present a fake offer and reject it in order to get more favorable treatment.
Here, another set of incentive constraints would be needed, complicating the model with-
out providing much more insight. So instead, it seems reasonable to assume that besides
the success of R & D project, only the sale of the company (including the date and price)
is contractible.
In the environment with buyers, it is still the case that in an optimal contract, the
principal will finance the agent for the project until some termination time, and there
is no benefit of delaying investment. Also similar to lemma 1, in an optimal contract,
payments only need to be made either at the time of success as a reward or at the time
of sale as a severance pay. Moreover, whenever the project has succeeded, or has been
terminated, there is no future financing of the project and the continuation value for the
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agent is zero. Then no payment is needed to induce the agent to sell the company, and I
assume that he makes optimal decisions for the principal.2 Note the selling problem after
success or termination is stationary, and will not interfere with the agent’s incentives.
In summary, we can focus on contracts given by (T B,wB,s(p), p, p), where T B 2N is
the last period that the agent is financed, wB = {wBt } is the reward to the agent when suc-
cess occurs at time t, s(p) = {st(p)}t<T specifies a severance pay to the agent conditional
on the company being sold in period t for price p when success has not happened, p is
the cutoff price above which the company is sold when the project has succeeded, and p
is the cutoff price when the project has terminated without success.
Given a contract, with some abuse of notations, I again use V nt , Unt and Pnt to denote
the agent’s value, the principal’s value and the total surplus between them at stage n in
period t. Then the agent at stage n is willing to sell the company in period t at price p if
and only if
st(p)  dV nt+1,n = 0,1.
In other words, if the principal would like the stage n company to be sold in period t, then
she has pay stage n agent a severance pay at least equal to his continuation value. Also,
it is obvious that V 1t   V 0t for all t. So if stage 1 agent is induced to sell the company
at some price p, stage 0 agent is also willing to accept the offer. By choosing st(p), the
principal is choosing at price p, whether the company will be sold at neither stage, or only
at stage 0, or at both stage 0 and stage 1.
2Equivalently, I can assume that after success or termination, the agent leaves the company, and the
principal makes selling decisions by herself.
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Lemma 4. If an optimal contract exists, then there is an optimal contract where for all
t < T , st(p) satisfies
st(p) =
8
>>>>>>>><
>>>>>>>>:
0 p < p0t
dV 0t p 2 [p0t , p1t )
dV 1t p 2 [p1t ,•)
(4.1)
for some p0t , p1t > 0 such that p1t > p0t .
Lemma 4 states that we can focus on contracts where the principal does not pay more
than stage n agent’s continuation value to induce the company at that stage to be sold.
Moreover, if it is optimal to have the company of stage n sold at price p, then it is also
optimal to do so for any p0 > p. Choosing s(p) = {st(p)}t<T is equivalent to choosing a
sequence of cutoff pairs (p0,p1) = {(p0t , p1t )}t<T such that the company of stage n = 0,1
will be sold in period t < T if and only if the offer p is no less than pnt . Define
µnt = 1 G(pnt ), n = 0,1, t < T.
So µnt is the probability that the company at stage n in period t will be sold. Choos-
ing (p0,p1) is equivalent to choosing (µ0t ,µ1t ) = {(µ0t ,µ1t )}t<T , and later on I use them
interchangeably when referring to a contract.
It is a standard search problem to characterize the optimal p and p.
Lemma 5. Let P be the value of the principal when success has happened and P be her
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value when the project has terminated without success. P is the unique solution to
(1 d )P = l
Z
z dP
(z dP)g(z)dz,
and P = P+Y . The optimal p and p are p = dP and p = dP.
A contract (T B,wB,p0,p1, p, p) will determine the value functions of the agent V nt and
total surplus functions Pnt . The agent will be induced to work or shirk at each stage in
each period. Similar to the no buyer case, it can be shown that in optimal contract stage 1
agent is always induced to work for t  T B, and there exists some tB0 < T B such that stage
0 agent is induced to work if and only if t  tB0 . The problem can now be written as
max
T B,tB0 ,w,p0,p1
P00  V 00
s.t. V 0t   c+dV 0t+1,8t  tB0 ,
V 0t = c+dV 0t+1,8t 2 (tB0 ,T B]; (IC: Stage 0) (P)
V 0t   c+dV 0t+1,8t  T B0 ; ( IC: Stage 1)
wt   0, 8t  T B0 . (LL)
The following proposition establishes the existence of the optimal contract.
Proposition 15. There exists a solution to problem (P’). The solution characterizes the
optimal contract if the maximized value is positive; otherwise no investment is optimal
for the principal.
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From now on I assume that the value to problem (P’) is positive.
In the rest of the section, I will characterize the properties of the optimal contracts.
Again, the key tension in the model is the endogenous information asymmetry of the
progress of innovation. As in the setting without buyers, one main problem regarding
this asymmetric information is how to use rewards for success and threat of termination
to simultaneously provide agents at different levels of progress with proper incentives to
work or shirk. In addition to that, with potential acquisitions offers, the other important
concern is what selling decisions to induce from agents with different levels of progress.
The two problems interact closely with each other. On the one hand, the selling decisions
in period t will affect the agent’s incentives to work in previous periods and the cost
of providing incentives; on the other hand, the moral hazard problem of the innovation
project will affect the optimal prices to sell a company.
4.1 Incentive Cost Minimization Given (T B, tB0 ,p0,p1): Ac-
quisition Rent
In this subsection, I take as given the termination time T B, the stopping time of working
for stage 0 agent tB0 and the cutoff selling prices (p0t ,p1t ) (or selling probabilities (µ0t ,µ1t ))
. Then the total surplus between the principal and the agent is fixed, and I study how to
minimize the cost of providing incentives to the agent. I will characterize the agent’s value
functions V nt and the reward function wnt in terms of (T B, tB0 ,p0t ,p1t ) (or (T B, tB0 ,µ0t ,µ1t )).
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As in section 2.2, there are a set of recursive equations that V 1t and V 1t satisfy, but this
time the possibility of acquisitions needs to be taken into account. For t  tB0 , stage 0
agent is supposed to work, and
V 0t = d (q+(1 q)l µ1t )V 1t+1 +d (1 q)(1 l µ1t )V 0t+1.
So if the stage 0 agent works, then there are two cases that he will have stage 1 agent’s
continuation value dVt+1. It is either when he makes the first breakthrough with probabil-
ity q, or when he accepts a acquisition offer greater than p1t and receives a severance pay
dV 1t+1. Otherwise, his value in the next period is V 0t+1. To prevent him from shirking, the
agent’s IC condition is for all t  tB0 ,
V 0t = d (q+(1 q)l µ1t )V 1t+1 +d (1 q)(1 l µ1t )V 0t+1
  c+dl µ1t V 1t+1 +d (1 l µ1t )V 0t+1 (4.2)
When t > tB0 , the agent is supposed to shirk, so
V 0t = c+dl µ1t V 1t+1 +d (1 l µ1t )V 0t+1, (4.3)
and in particular V 0T B = c.
Again the agent has the option to always shirk, and that provides a lower bound for
the agent’s ex ante payoff V 00 . But unlike the case without buyers, by always shirking,
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the agent is getting more than the discounted value of total funds for investment. This
is because when a acquisition offer p   p1t arrives, by selling the company the agent
can receive the stage 1 agent’s continuation payoff dV 1t , which is larger than his own
continuation payoff. The next proposition solves for the minimum agent’s ex ante payoff
V 00 , and the associated V
n
t and wt for t = 1, ...,T B,n = 0,1.
Proposition 16. In an optimal contract with (T B, tB0 ,p0t ,p1t ) (or (T B, tB0 ,µ0t ,µ1t )), the
agent’s ex ante payoff is
V 00 = c
T B
Â
i=0
d i + c
tB0
Â
i=0
d i l µ
1
i
q(1 l µ1i )
.
Stage 0 agent’s IC conditions are binding for t  tB0 and stage 1 agent’s IC conditions are
binding for t > tB0 +1. The agent’s value functions V
n
t are
V 0t = c
T B t
Â
i=0
d i + c
tB0
Â
i=t
d i t l µ
1
i
q(1 l µ1i )
, 8t = 0, ..., tB0 ;
V 0t = c
T B t
Â
i=0
d i, 8t = tB0 +1, ...,T B.
V 1t =V
0
t +
c
dq(1 l µ1t 1)
, 8t = 1, ..., tB0 +1;
V 1t =V
0
t = c
T B t
Â
i=0
d i, 8t = tB0 +2, ...,T B.
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The reward function wt is
wt = dV 1t+1 +
V 1t  dV 1t+1
q
, 8t = 1, ...,T B.
Proposition 16 shows that as in the case without buyers, the cost-minimizing way
to provide incentives is to make stage 0 agent always indifferent between working and
shirking when he is supposed to work. The agent’s ex ante payoff is equal to the payoff
he can get by always shirking.
However, unlike in the previous section, now incentive cost minimization also requires
stage 1 agent’s IC to be binding for t > tB0 + 1. Recall that in the environment without
buyers, there are multiple {V 1t } for t > tB0 + 1 that are consistent with optimal contracts.
The reason there is that for t > tB0 , stage 0 agent is supposed to shirk, and he will not reach
stage 1. Therefore the agent’s ex ante payoff, which is the payoff from always shirking,
will not be affected by V 1t for t > tB0 +1. So V
1
t can be chosen arbitrarily for t > tB0 +1 as
long as the relevant IC conditions are satisfied, and V 1t is not necessarily minimized for
t > tB0 +1. With arrivals of acquisitions offers and possibility of sale, this is no longer the
case. Even when stage 0 agent is shirking in period t, he may still receive stage 1 agent’s
continuation payoff dV 1t+1, because there may be a acquisition offer high enough such
that the principal wants induce stage 1 agent to accept the offer. Therefore, to minimize
the agent’s ex ante payoff, the contract must also make V 1t as small as possible in each
period, and the function V 1t is uniquely determined for all t = 1, ...,T B.
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From Proposition 16, we can see that µ0t does not enter the agent’s value functions.
That is to say, inducing only stage 0 agent to sell does not incur extra incentive cost. This
is because the principal only needs to pay dV 0t to stage 0 agent for him to accept an offer,
which is the same as what he will get by not selling. In contrast, one key result is that the
agent’s ex ante payoff is strictly increasing in the probabilities that the stage 1 firm is sold
µ1t for t  tB0 :
V 00 = c
T B
Â
i=0
d i + c
tB0
Â
i=0
d i l µ
1
i
q(1 l µ1i )
.
The first part in the agent’s ex ante payoff is the discounted value of total investments
to divert; the second part is the agent’s acquisition rent. If the principal wants to use
lower cutoff p1t and have lower offers accepted for stage 1 company in period t, then
not only stage 1 agent, but also stage 0 agent will more likely receive the severance pay
dV 1t+1. In periods prior to t, the agent of stage 0 understands that even he shirks, there
is a larger chance that the company will be sold as if the stage is 1. Therefore he has
more incentive to shirk in previous periods and inducing him to work becomes more
costly. Note the acquisition rent is only caused by potential buyers arriving before tB0 +1,
because after that stage 0 and stage 1 agents have the same values and stage 0 agent will
not get compensated by more than his continuation value for selling the company.
I have shown that potential acquisitions increase the incentive cost gives the agent a
acquisition rent. In the next two subsections, I will show how the acquisition rent affects
the selling prices of the company and the principal’s financing problem.
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4.2 Optimality on (p0,p1): Moral Hazard Premiums
Suppose (T B, tB0 ,w,p0,p1) is an optimal contract. In this subsection, I characterize opti-
mality conditions regarding (p0,p1). Choosing what offers to accept will affect the prin-
cipal’s payoff U = P V through both the total surplus available from the project P = P00
and the agent’s ex ante payoff V = V 00 . Subsection 4.1 shows the impact of (p0,p1) on
V 00 . Next I study its impact on the total surplus.
First note that if the project is successful, the total surplus is P, and if the project is
terminated without success, the total surplus is P which comes solely from sale of the
company, where P and P are defined as in lemma 5. If the project is at stage 1 in period
t  T B, then the total surplus P1t follows
P1t = qP+(1 q)

l
Z •
p1t
zg(z)dz+(1 l (1 G(p1t )))dP1t+1
 
  c. (4.4)
With probability q the project becomes successful and the total surplus increases to P;
without success, if the buyer arrives and offers a price higher than the cutoff p1t , then the
company will be sold; otherwise, the project moves to the next period staying at stage 1.
If the project is at stage 0, for t  tB0 ,
P0t =q

l
Z •
p1t
zg(z)dz+(1 l (1 G(p1t )))dP1t+1
 
+(1 q)

l
Z •
p0t
zg(z)dz+(1 l (1 G(p0t )))dP0t+1
 
  c;
(4.5)
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for t = tB0 , ...,T
B,
P0t = l
Z •
p0t
zg(z)dz+(1 l (1 G(p0t )))dP0t+1. (4.6)
Let P be the probability measure induced over the set of all outcomes. Define
rnt = P(nt = n\no sale), n = 0,1,2;
So rnt is the probability that the project is at stage n and the company has not been sold.
Proposition 17. In an optimal contract, the cutoff prices p0t , p1t satisfy
p0t = dP0t+1, 8t  T B;
p1t =
8
>><
>>:
dP1t+1 +
c
(r0t q+r1t (1 q))q[1 l (1 G(p1t ))]2
, t  tB0
dP1t+1, tB0 < t  T B
.
As discussed in section 4.1, for t  T B, inducing stage 0 agent to sell does not affect
the agent’s payoff, because the severance pay needed is exactly equal to his continuation
value dV 0t . Therefore, the optimal cutoffs should equal to the total surplus after rejecting
the offer. In other words, in these cases the principal should make a severance pay to
induce the agent to accept the offer if and only if the price is higher than the total surplus
that can be generated from the project after rejecting the offer. Given the investment
choices, the selling decisions of the stage 0 project are made as if there is no agency
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problem. The same is true for selling stage 1 project in periods t > tB0 because V
1
t+1 =V
0
t+1
for t > tB0 .
However, if the principal wants to induce agents at stage 1 to accept an offer in period
t  tB0 , she has to pay dV 1t+1, which is larger than stage 0 agent’s continuation value.
The agent therefore receives extra rent because of the potential acquisition, and inducing
incentives in earlier periods becomes more costly. As a result, the principal would like
the stage 1 project to be sold less often to reduce the agent’s acquisition rent. She may
not want to induce the agent to accept an offer even if the offer is higher than the surplus
from continuing the project. More specifically, at stage 1, an offer p will be accepted in
period t  tB0 if and only if
p dP1t+1  
c
(r0t q+r1t (1 q))q[1 l (1 G(p1t ))]2
= MHP.
I call the right hand side of the above inequality the moral hazard premium (MHP). This
is extra amount of money the buyer needs to pay in order for the offer to be accepted
by a stage 1 agent in addition to the continuation value of keeping the firm. MPH is
decreasing in r0t q+r1t (1 q)), which is the probability that the project is unsold and is
at stage 1 after the investment in period t. In general, this probability is first increasing
and then decreasing, and thus MPH is first decreasing then increasing. The cutoffs p1t is
non-monotone in t. Also, MPH is increasing in per period cost c. When the agent can
divert more investment in a period, the agency problem is worse, and the moral hazard
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premium is higher.
In this model, there is one startup company with an innovation project. Imagine a
world with many such innovating companies with heterogeneous values. Buyers that
cannot observe the progress of innovations face a lemon problem: agents on projects with
less progress are more likely to accept an offer. This is true even without the moral hazard
problem because projects with less progress have lower value to continue. The result on
moral hazard premium suggests that the agency problem in innovation aggravates the
lemon problem. To reduce the acquisition rent received by agents, the projects with more
progress are sold even less likely at even higher prices. Conditional on an offer being
accepted, the probability that the project is with slow progress is larger than the case
without the moral hazard problem.
4.3 Investment Choices (T B, tB0 )
In this subsection, I analyze the impact of acquisition rent on the total amount of invest-
ment the principal chooses to finance, and the total amount of investment made by stage
0 agent.
In the environment without buyers, recall that T is the last period in which the agent
is financed by the principal and t0 is the last period that stage 0 agent is induced to work.
Let T B and tB0 be the corresponding values in the case with buyers.
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Proposition 18.
T B  T.
Moreover, there exist parameter values such that the inequality is strict.
Proposition 18 states that if the buyers arrive often enough and their valuations are
high enough, then the investment on innovation with potential acquisition offers is less
than the case without acquisitions offers in two aspects: First, the total investment that the
principal commits to finance the agent is less; second, the agent with slow progress gives
up on the project earlier.
Intuitively, the presence of potential buyers gives the agent additional acquisition rent
and makes inducing honest investment more costly. To balance the increased incentive
cost, in an optimal contract, the principal would like to commit to a smaller amount of
total investment, and ask the agent with little progress to stop working earlier.
This result have empirical implications on the relationship between investment lengths
and success probabilities of innovation projects. During economic bubbles such as the
“dot-com” bubble at the end of 20th century, hot money flowed in and buyers’ valua-
tions over tech firms surged due to frenzy speculations. Acquisitions became much more
probable. However, since the operation of startups are more or less opaque and it is hard
for the initial investors and outside buyers to monitor the progress of the innovation, the
possibility of acquisition offers created huge inventive problems for entrepreneurs. They
had strong incentives to shirk because they knew that even little progress was made, it
was likely that they would be bailed out by selling the companies to buyers making wild
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offers. In response to this increased incentive costs, the initial investors became more
impatient. They invested in projects hoping for some quick outcome or sell-off, and were
less willing to commit to longer investment periods. Partly because of this, although
more projects were financed due to the capital inflow, the overall quality of startups in
terms of probability of success and survival time became worse, which might have in turn
contributed to the burst of the bubble.
Saffie and Ates (2013), using Chilean data of 1998, found that firms born during eco-
nomic downturn tended to grow better than in other times. Their main theory is that
due to credit shortage, financial institutions were more careful at screening and select-
ing projects, and therefore projects that actually got financed were intrinsically of better
quality. My model suggests an alternative and complementary explanation to the phe-
nomenon. During credit shortage, acquisitions were less a concern, and the agents’ in-
centive problems were alleviated. Investors were willing to commit to longer investment
and the probabilities of success were higher.
4.4 Discussion: Strategic Buyers
In this chapter, I have been assuming that buyers are non-strategic and offers are random
variables drawn from some distribution. This is a reasonable assumption in situations
where buyers’ valuation for the startup are observable to the agent, and the agent has all
the bargaining power. In this section, I discuss the other extreme, namely, buyers have
all the bargaining power and make take-it-or-leave-it (TIOLI) offers upon arrivals. Here
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I argue that the qualitative results are not driven by that buyers are non-strategic. Details
on the results are available on request.
First, the acquisition rent still arises and the agent’s ex ante payoff is larger than if
he always diverts funds financed by the principal. Its driving force is that when the com-
pany is sold off, the principal cannot distinguish agents with different levels of progress.
Therefore, if the principal wants to sell when the project is stage 1, she has to pay stage
1 agent’s continuation value dV 1t+1 to both stage 1 and stage 0 agent. Therefore, even if
the agent has always been shirking, there is a chance that in some period he gets a payoff
equal to as if he has made some progress. So the acquisition rent exists no matter whether
offers by buyers are strategic or not, as long as the stage 1 project is sold with positive
probability. Moreover, the agent’s acquisition rent is larger when the stage 1 project is
sold more likely.
Second, since the agent’s acquisition rent is increasing in the probability that stage
1 project is sold, in an optimal contract, the stage 1 project is induced to be sold less
likely, and the cutoff offers for acceptance are higher than if there is no agency problem.
When buyers are non-strategic, the cutoff offers in no-agency-problem benchmark are the
continuation surplus of the project after the current offer is rejected. When buyers are
strategic, another consideration kicks in. They will no longer simply bid their valuations;
instead they will infer from the contract that whether an offer will be accepted or rejected
by the agent with different stages. Depending on their valuations, they will either not
make an offer, or bid the cutoff price for stage 0 agent and only buys stage 0 companies,
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or bid the cutoff price for stage 1 agent and buy companies of both types. In other words,
by specifying different cutoff prices for acceptance, the contract can affect the offers made
by the buyers. Thus while it is the buyer that makes the TIOLI offer, by committing to a
contract, the startup actually has the the bargaining power; the situation is equivalent to a
monopoly posting a pair of prices for the company at each stage. So without the agency
problem, the contract would specify the cutoff prices that maximize the monopoly profit
given the buyers value distribution with the cost being the continuation surpluses of not
selling. Unlike the non-strategic buyer case, the cutoff prices will be higher than the
continuation surpluses of not selling even without the agency problem. Essentially, by
contracting with an agent, the principal can change the agent’s payoff in the bargaining
game between the agent and the buyer, and obtain more commitment power. This idea
similar to Fershtman and Judd (1987), Fershtman, Judd, and Kalai (1991) and Cai and
Cont (2004).
With the monopoly pricing as the no-agency-problem benchmark, it still holds that
due to the moral hazard problem, the cutoffs for stage 1 agent are higher than the optimal
monopoly prices without agency problem. The intuition is the same: Raising the cutoff
prices for stage 1 agent will decrease the agent’s acquisition rent; although it decreases
the expected profit from the sold-off, the principal is still better off.
Finally, with strategic buyers, the optimal amount of financing is still less than with-
out potential acquisitions. The driving forces in the case of non-strategic buyers are the
increased cost of financing due to the acquisition rent and decreased benefit of financing
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because of the possibility of a sold-off before success. These forces still exist when the
buyers are strategic.
I have argued that similar results hold when assuming strategic buyers. There is one
additional complication that is worth noting. With non-strategic buyers, future offers
will not depend on whether a offer was rejected in the past, and since the contract does
not depend on rejected offers, the agent’s valuation only depends on the stage of the
project. This is no longer true when buyers are strategic and can observe past offers.
Buyers will make inferences about the agent’s progress based on these past offers. On
the one hand, rejects of past offers will affect the buyers’ valuations if they care about
partial progress. On the other hand, since agents with different levels of progress have
different acceptance cutoffs, buyers will have different beliefs about whether an offer will
be accepted depending on past offers. Therefore, buyers’ strategies depend on past offers,
and so do the agent’s value functions. More specifically, there will be three relevant value
functions for the agent: the value when he is at stage 1, the value when he is stage 0 but
buyers think that he is at stage 1 because he rejected an offer that stage 0 is supposed to
accept, and the value when he is stage 0 and has deviated.
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Appendix A
Appendices to Chapter 2
Throughout the proofs, define Â ji (·) = 0 for all j < i.
A.1 Characterization of Optimal Contracts
Calculation of Assumption 1. We calculate the planner’s payoff by always investing until
success P⇤. The probability that success occurs in period t⇤   1 is
t⇤ 1
Â
t 0=0
q1q2(1 q1)t
0
(1 q2)t
⇤ t 0 1 =
q1q2
q1  q2
h
(1 q2)t
⇤   (1 q1)t
⇤
i
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So
P⇤ =
•
Â
t⇤=1
q1q2
q1  q2
h
(1 q2)t
⇤   (1 q1)t
⇤
i 
d t
⇤
Y  
t⇤
Â
t=0
d tc
!
=
q1q2
q1  q2
•
Â
t⇤=1
h
(1 q2)t
⇤   (1 q1)t
⇤
i 
d t
⇤
Y   c1 d
t⇤+1
1 d
!
=
q1q2
q1  q2
Y
•
Â
t⇤=1
h
d t
⇤
(1 q2)t
⇤  d t⇤(1 q1)t
⇤
i
  q1q2
q1  q2
· c
1 d
•
Â
t⇤=1
(1 d t⇤+1)
h
(1 q2)t
⇤   (1 q1)t
⇤
i
=
q1q2
q1  q2
Y

d (1 q2)
1 d (1 q2)
  d (1 q1)
1 d (1 q1)
 
  q1q2
q1  q2
· c
1 d
✓
1 q2
q2
  1 q1
q1
◆
 d
✓
d (1 q2)
1 d (1 q2)
  d (1 q1)
1 d (1 q1)
◆ 
=
dq1q2Y
[1 d (1 q1)][1 d (1 q2)]
  c
1 d

1  d
2q1q2
[1 d (1 q1)][1 d (1 q2)]
 
=
1
[1 d (1 q1)][1 d (1 q2)]
[dq1q2Y   (1 d +d (q1 +q2))c]
So P⇤   0 implies
Y   [1 d +d (q1 +q2)]
dq1q2
c.
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose the optimal contract G specifies a payment scheme {wt} con-
ditional on success in period t and a unconditional payment b > 0 in some period t . Now
consider an alternative contract Ĝ that specifies the same termination time T and induces
the same actions as G. The only difference is that Ĝ specifies 0 unconditional payment
in period t, and ŵt = wt + b/q. We will show that under Ĝ the IC conditions are still
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satisfied and the agent’s ex ante value is strictly smaller.
First note that the value functions for both stage 0 and stage 1 agents are not affected
for t > t . We have V̂ 0t = V 0t for t > t . So the IC conditions are not affected for t   t .
Moreover, stage 1 agent’s value function remain the same even for t  t , i.e., V̂ 1t =V 1t for
all t  T , and stage 1 agent’s IC conditions are still satisfied for all t  T . For the stage 0
agent, his value at t is strictly smaller because of the loss of the unconditional payment b ,
i.e., , V̂ 0t <V 0t . Hence, stage 0 agent’s value for t < t also becomes smaller, including the
ex ante payoff. Since the gap between the stage 0 and stage 1 agents’ values are larger, it
is easier for stage 0 agent’s IC conditions to satisfy for t < t .
Proof of Proposition 1. It remains to prove that for all t < t0, condition (2.2) holds, i.e.,
P1t+1  P0t+1  
c
dq
. (2.2)
We prove it by induction.
1. In period t0, condition (2.2) holds by construction.
2. Suppose condition (2.2) holds for some t  t0. Then
P0t = d (qP1t+1 +(1 q)P0t+1)  c.
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Thus
P1t  P0t = P1t  d (qP1t+1 +(1 q)P0t+1)+ c
> P1t+1  d (qP1t+1 +(1 q)P0t+1)+ c
= (1 dq)P1t+1   (1 dq)P0t+1 +(1 d )P0t+1 + c
= (1 dq)(P1t+1  P0t+1)+(1 d )P0t+1 + c
  (1 dq) c
dq
+(1 d )P0t+1 + c
  c
dq
,
where the first inequality holds because Pt is strictly decreasing in t.
So condition (2.2) holds for all t < t0 with strict inequality.
Proof of Proposition 3. As discussed, the marginal cost of investment in period T is the
increase in the agent’s ex ante payoff, d T c. Next we calculate its marginal benefit.
Compare the total surplus generated by the project between contract with termination
time T  1 and one with T . Stage 0 agent stops working after t0,T 1 and t0,T respectively,
with t0,T = t0,T 1 +1. There are three cases:
1. Conditional on the event that two breakthroughs occur by period t0,T 1, the two
contracts generate the same total surplus.
2. Conditional on the event that exactly one breakthrough occurs by period t0,T 1, the
contract with T generates more surplus because stage 1 agent has one more period
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to make investment. The increase in surplus is
Q1(t0,T )Q0(t̂)d T (dqY   c).
3. Conditional on the event that no breakthrough occurs by t0,T 1, the contract with T
generates more surplus because it gives one more chance to reach stage 1 in period
t0,T . The increase in surplus is
Q0(t0,T )d t0,T (dqP1(t̂)  c)
Summing up, the marginal benefit to invest in period T is
P00,T  P00,T 1 = Q1(t0,T )Q0(t̂)d T (dqY   c)+Q0(t0,T )d t0,T 1(dqP1(t̂)  c), 8T   t̂.
Note that (P00,T  P00,T 1)/d T first increases and then decreases in T , and converges to 0
as T goes to infinity. So either P00,T  V 00,T is maximized at
T ⇤ = max
T
{T : P00,T  P00,T 1   d T c},
or P00,T  V 00,T is always negative for all T .
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof is broken down to two parts:
First, I prove that within the class of deterministic contracts without reports, the opti-
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mal contract does not delay financing.
Take any contract G where financing is provided in k 2 {2,3, ...,•} phases for t 2
[ki=1[ti,t 0i ) where ti+1 > t 0i for all i 2 {1, ...,k  1}. I will show there is a contract con-
sisting of only one financing phase that gives the principal at least the same payoff as G
does. Define `i = t 0i  ti for i = 1, ...,k and `0 = 0; define si = ti+1 t 0i for i = 1, ...,k 1
and s0 = t1. So `i is the length of the ith financing phase and si’s are the lengths of
intervals in which financing is suspended.
Recall that Pnt is the total surplus of the project at stage n in period t. Let P̃(i) be the
expected total surplus in period ti conditional on success did not occur before the ti, the
ith financing phase, i.e.,
P̃(i) = P(nti = 0|nti 6= 2)P0ti +P(nti = 1|nti 6= 2)P
1
ti , i = 1, ...,k; P̃(k+1) = 0.
Let P(i) = P̃(i)  d `i+siP̃(i+ 1). Then P(i) is the total surplus at the beginning of the
ith phase conditional on success occurs in the ith phase.
Define
V (i) = c
`i 1
Â
t=0
d t ,
and define
Ṽ (i) =V (i)+
k
Â
m=i+1
d `m+smV (m).
Since the agent has the option to always shirk, his value at ti given by contract G is
bounded from below by Ṽ (i). In particular, his ex ante payoff is bounded from below by
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s0Ṽ (1).
Define
j = min
 
i 2 {1, ...,k} : P̃(i) Ṽ (i)< 0
 
,
and let j = k+ 1 when the set is empty. Note that if k = •, then the set will never be
empty, and it is dominated by some contract with finite periods of financing.
If j   2, let contract G0 be an optimal cutoff contract with termination date T =
Â j 1i=1 `i   1 as characterized in Proposition 2. If j = 1 then the project is not financed
at all in contract G0. I will argue contract G0 yields at least the same payoff to the principal
as G.
If j = 1, P̃(1)  Ṽ (1) < 0. Under G, the ex ante total surplus is s0P̃(1), and the
agent’s ex ante payoff is bounded from below by s0Ṽ (1). Therefore the principal’s ex
ante payoff is negative, and she is better off by not financing the project at all.
If j   2, under G, the ex ante total surplus generated from the project can be expressed
as
P =
j 1
Â
i=1
d tiP(i)+d t jP̃( j);
the agent’s ex ante payoff is bounded from below by
j 1
Â
i=1
d tiV (i)+d t jṼ ( j).
88
Thus, the principal’s ex ante payoff U under G satisfies
U 
j 1
Â
i=1
d ti [P(i) V (i)]+d t j
⇥
P̃( j) Ṽ ( j)
⇤
.
Under G0, the project is financed for the same length as the total length of the first j  1
phases under G. Suppose the same sequence of actions were induced as in the first j 1
phases in G, but delays are eliminated, then the total surplus would be
j 1
Â
i=1
d Â
i 1
m=0 `mP(i).
By Proposition 2, we know that G0 induces socially efficient actions given termination
time Â j 1i=1 `i   1. So the total surplus P0 under G0 is bounded from below by the above
expression. Also by Proposition 2, under G0, the agent’s ex ante payoff V 0 is exactly equal
to the payoff that he can get from always shirking, i.e.,
V 0 =
j 1
Â
i=1
d Â
i 1
m=0 `mV (i).
Thus, the principal’s ex ante payoff U 0 under G0 satisfies
U 0  
j 1
Â
i=1
d Â
i 1
m=0 `m [P(i) V (i)] .
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Comparing U 0 and U ,
U 0  U  
j 1
Â
i=1
⇣
d Â
i 1
m=0 `m  d ti
⌘
[P(i) V (i)] d t j
⇥
P̃( j) Ṽ ( j)
⇤
 
j 1
Â
i=1
⇣
d Â
i 1
m=0 `m  d ti
⌘
[P(i) V (i)] ,
because P̃( j) Ṽ ( j)< 0.
To complete the proof that U 0  U   0, I show by induction that for all i0  j 1,
j 1
Â
i=i0
⇣
d ti0 1+Â
i 1
m=i0 1 `m  d ti
⌘
[P(i) V (i)]  0. (A.1)
By the definition of j, it is true that for all h  j 1,
j 1
Â
i=h
d ti [P(i) V (i)]  0; (A.2)
otherwise, P̃(h) Ṽ (h)< 0, and it violates the definition of j.
1. Let h = j 1 in (A.2), then P( j 1) V ( j 1)  0. So the inequality (A.1) holds
for i0 = j 1.
2. Suppose inequality (A.1) holds for i0 = i00 2 (1, j 1], i.e.,
j 1
Â
i=i00
⇣
d ti00 1+Â
i 1
m=i00 1 `m  d ti
⌘
[P(i) V (i)]  0. (A.3)
It remains to show that (A.1) holds for i0 = i00  1.
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Equation (A.3) implies
j 1
Â
i=i00
d ti [P(i) V (i)]
j 1
Â
i=i00
d ti00 1+Â
i 1
m=i00 1 `m [P(i) V (i)] . (A.4)
Let h = i00  1 in (A.2):
j 1
Â
i=i00 1
d ti [P(i) V (i)]  0; (A.5)
Equations (A.4) and (A.5) imply
0 
j 1
Â
i=i00 1
d ti [P(i) V (i)]
 d ti00 1
⇥
P(i0  1) V (i0  1)
⇤
+
j 1
Â
i=i00
d ti00 1+Â
i 1
m=i00 1 `m [P(i) V (i)]
 d ti00 2
⇥
P(i0  1) V (i0  1)
⇤
+
j 1
Â
i=i00
d ti00 2+Â
i 1
m=i00 1 `m [P(i) V (i)]  0

j 1
Â
i=i00 1
d ti00 2+Â
i 1
m=i00 2 `m [P(i) V (i)] ,
which implies inequality (A.1) holds for i0 = i00  1.
Next I prove that random contracts are dominated by deterministic contract.
Take any contract with random financing strategies. Ex ante, it induces a probability
distribution P over the random termination time T̃ . The agent’s payoff is bounded from
below by
EP
 
c
T̃
Â
i=0
d i
!
.
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Conditional on each realized T̃ , the total surplus generated is bounded above by the social
planner’s surplus under the realization PT̃ . So the principle’s payoff is no larger than
EP
 
PT̃   c
T̃
Â
i=0
d i
!
.
However, under the optimal deterministic contract, the principal’s payoff is
max
T
 
PT   c
T
Â
i=0
d i
!
.
So no random contract yields a higher payoff to the principal than the optimal determin-
istic contract.
In the main body of the paper, contracting on reports of the project’s progress is not
allowed. This assumption may be justified by practical reasons. In reality, the progress of
a project in reality may be difficult to understand for outsiders and it may be impossible
for the agent to communicate effectively with the principal. Even they can communicate
and understand, it is often difficult to contract on such reports and enforce it. In the
following, I show that contracting on report not only may be infeasible in practice, but
also does not make a difference when the principal and agent can only write deterministic
contract.
Proposition 19. If only deterministic contracts are allowed, then contracting on progress
reports cannot improve the principal’s payoff.
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Proof. Suppose now the agent can report the progress to the principal and the contractible
histories include all past reports. Consider any contract G, it can be shown that there exists
another contract that does not depend on the reports that gives the principal at least the
same payoff. Let T M be the largest termination time for all possible reports under G. The
agent’s payoff under G is at least ÂT
M
i=0 d ic, since he has the option to always shirk and
make reports such that he is financed until T M. Let P(T M) be the planner’s payoff in
the planner’s problem with a termination time T M. Then the principal’s payoff under G
is at most P(T M) ÂT
M
i=0 d ic. Now consider the optimal contract without reports with a
termination time T M, G0. In proposition 2, it has been proved that the principal’s payoff
under G0 is P(T M) ÂT
M
i=0 d ic. So contracting on reports cannot improve the principal’s
payoff.
The key reason that contracting on report does not help in this case is that to induce
truthful report, the principal needs to compensate the agent for the forgone financing. But
since the optimal contract without reports is efficient given the length of financing anyway,
the principal would rather just give the agent the same amount of financing regardless of
the reports.
It is worth noting that if the parties can use randomized contracts that are contingent
on report, the principal will be strictly better off. Consider a three-period example without
discounting, t = 0,1,2 and the following financing strategy. The agent is financed at t = 0
and is asked to report whether the first breakthrough has occurred. If reporting yes, then
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the agent is financed for only one more period for sure; if no, then the agent is financed
for zero or two more periods with 1/2 probability each. The rewards for final success
are designed such that the agent is indifferent between working and shirking at stage 0.
Under this contract, the agent is weakly willing to report the truth, and receives an ex
ante payoff of 2c. But the social surplus is higher than a two-period planner’s problem.
Conditional on a breakthrough in period 0, the social surplus is the same. Conditional on
no breakthrough in period 0, with 1/2 probability the project is terminated, which is what
happens in a two-period planner’s problem; but with 1/2 probability the project is financed
for two more periods, which yields higher social surplus. So randomized contracts that
depend on report can strictly improve efficiency without increasing the incentive cost.
A.2 Implications of Unobserved Innovation Progress
Proof of Proposition 5. The proof is broken down to four steps.
Step 1 Claim that if the stage 0 agent is financed if and only if t  t̃ for some termination
time t̃0, then conditional on the first breakthrough has occurred by t̃0, the agent is
always financed until T̃ , regardless of when the time of the first breakthrough. To
show this claim is true, consider two cases, cÂT̃ t̃0i=1 d i   c/(dq) and cÂ
T̃ t̃0
i=1 d i <
c/(dq).
Case 1. Suppose cÂT̃ t̃0i=1 d i   c/(dq). Consider the following kind of continu-
ation contracts after the first breakthrough: some non-negative rewards (0 at t̃0)
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at are made for the first breakthrough; the agent is financed up to period T̃ , and
the rewards for success are as specified in Proposition 6. Then in the continuation
contracts, the agent is indifferent between working and shirking. Conditional on
that the first breakthrough occurs in period t 2 {0,1, ..., t̃0}, his continuation value
(after rewards for the first breakthrough) is exactly cÂT̃ ti=1 d i. In period t̃0, since
cÂT̃ t̃0i=1 d i   c/(dq), the stage 0 agent has a strict incentive to work under the
specified continuation contract without additional rewards. For t  t̃0, the stage
0 agent’s incentive to work becomes weaker and weaker as t decreases. At some
point, additional rewards for the first breakthrough are needed to make the agent
just indifferent. Therefore, the specified contract is incentive compatible. By
Proposition 1 and 6, since T̃  T ⇤, it can be verified that the optimal termination
time of financing T when the innovation requires only one breakthrough is larger
than T̃ . Then the specified contract maximizes the principal’s payoff conditional
on any date of the first breakthrough, and thus maximizes the principal’s ex ante
payoff.
Case 2. Suppose cÂT̃ t̃0i=1 d i < c/(dq). Then under the continuation contracts
specified above, the stage 0 agent does not have a incentive to work. Instead of
not rewarding for the first breakthrough, now specify a reward schedule for the
first breakthrough w̃t such that the stage 0 agent is indifferent between working
and shirking at any time t  t̃0. The agent is still financed until T̃ conditional
on the first breakthrough, and the rewards for success remain the same. Under
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this contract (given t̃0), the agent’s ex ante payoff is minimized (equal to always
shirking), and the total surplus of the project is maximized. The principal’s ex
ante payoff is thus maximized.
Step 2 Claim that there exists some t̃0 < T such that the stage 0 agent is financed if and
only if t  t̃0. Suppose conversely that the stage 0 is financed for a total of t̃0
periods, but there is some period in which financing is temporarily suspended.
If cÂT̃ t̃0i=1 d i   c/(dq), then the contract is dominated by the contract specified in
Step 1, Case 1 with termination date of financing t̃0 for stage 0, because condi-
tional on the number of periods of investment needed for the first breakthrough,
the principal’s payoff is smaller.
If cÂT̃ t̃0i=1 d i   c/(dq), then the contract is dominated by the contract specified in
Step 1, Case 2, by the same argument as in the proof of Proposition 4.
Step 3 Claim that t̃0  t0. Suppose not. Then consider the optimal contract given ter-
mination time of financing t̃0   1 for the stage 0 agent. First observe that, under
the new contract, the agent’s ex ante payoff decreases at least by (1 q)t̃0d t̃0c. In
Case 2, the decrease is equal to d t̃0c, since the agent’s ex ante payoff is equal to
as if the value from always shirking. In Case 1, the agent’s payoff stays the same
conditional on that the first breakthrough occurs by t̃0   1; otherwise, his payoff
decreases by at least d t̃0c, because he loses the option to shirk and receives c in
period t̃0. At the same time, since t0 is the socially efficient time to terminate the
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stage 0 project, the new contract yields higher total surplus. Hence, the principal’s
payoff is strictly improved.
Step 4 Let the parameters be parameterized by rates in continuous time and the length of
a period D, i.e., q = qrD, c = crD and d = e rD for some qr, cr, and r. The value
of success is still denoted by Y . Let the exogenous deadline T̃ be equal to T ⇤.
Claim that there exists D such that if D < D, then t̃0 < t0.
First, as D goes to 0, by proposition 3, T ⇤D converges to some S⇤, and by propo-
sition 1, t0D converges to some s0. Suppose t̃0 = t0 for all D. Then for D small
enough, by the argument of Step 3, choosing another contract with termination
time t̃0 = t0 1 for stage 0 decreases the agent’s payoff by at least
⇣
e (r+q)s0   e
⌘
cD
for arbitrarily small e . It remains to show that the decrease in total surplus is o(D).
Recall that the total surplus of the stage 1 project in period t given termination
time T̃ is
P1t,T̃ =
qY   c
1 d (1 q)(1  [d (1 q)]
T̃ t+1).
The efficient time to terminate stage 0 project t0 satisfies
P1t0+1,T̃ =
qY   c
1 d (1 q)(1  [d (1 q)]
T̃ t0)  c
dq
and
P1t0+2,T̃ =
qY   c
1 d (1 q)(1  [d (1 q)]
T̃ t0 1)<
c
dq
.
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So
P1t0+1,T̃  P
1
t0+2,T̃
= [d (1 q)]T̃ t0 1(qY   c)
= [d (1 q)]T̃ t0 1(qrY   cr)D
= O(D).
Thus,
P1t0+1,T̃ =
c
dq
+O(D).
In the contract with stage 0 termination time t̃ = t0, the total surplus for stage 0
project at time t0 is
P0t̃0,T̃ = dqP
1
t0+1,T̃
  c = dqO(D) = e rDqDO(D) = o(D).
In the contract with t̃ = t0  1, the total surplus for stage 0 project at time t0 is 0.
The different in total surplus of the stage 0 project at t0 is o(D), and hence so is
the difference in ex ante total surplus.
Proof of Proposition 6. When innovation only requires one breakthrough, given a termi-
nation time of financing T , the agent is always induced to work. Given a contract (w,T ),
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his value function Vt follows
Vt = max{qwt +d (1 q)Vt+1)| {z }
Value from working
, c+dVt+1| {z }
Value from shirking
}, 8t = 0, ...,T.
The IC condition in period t is
Vt   c+dVt+1,
or
wt   dVt+1 +
c
q
.
To minimize the agent’s value, the IC conditions need to be binding in every period, and
for all t  T ,
Vt = c
T t
Â
i=0
d i; wt = c
 
T t
Â
i=1
d i + 1
q
!
.
By increasing the termination time from T  1 to T , the increase in total surplus is
(1 q)T d T (qY   c);
the increase in the agent’s value is d T c. So the optimal T should satisfy
T = max{t : (1 q)td t(qY   c)  d tc},
or
T =
 
log1 q
c
qY   c
⌫
.
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Note that under a non-generic set of parameters, the agent may be indifferent between
termination time T and T +1, and so there could be two optimal termination time. Here
we choose the larger one whenever there are indifferences.
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Appendix B
Appendices to Chapter 3
B.1 Difficult Task Go First
Proof of Lemma 2. The surplus by doing task E first is
P(ED) =
t0
Â
i=0
qE(1 qE)i
(
T 1 i
Â
j=0
qD(1 qD) j [Y   (i+ j+2)c]  (1 qD)T i(T +1)c
)
  (1 qE)t0+1(t0 +1)c
Using
t
Â
i=0
q(1 q)i = 1  (1 q)t+1
and
t
Â
i=0
(i+1)q(1 q)i = 1
q
 
✓
1
q
+ t +1
◆
(1 q)t+1,
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we have
T 1 i
Â
j=0
qD(1 qD) j [Y   (i+ j+2)c]  (1 qD)T i(T +1)c
=
T 1 i
Â
j=0
qD(1 qD) j [Y   (i+1)c  ( j+1)c]  (1 qD)T i(T +1)c
=[Y   (i+1)c]
T 1 i
Â
j=0
qD(1 qD) j   c
T 1 i
Â
j=0
( j+1)qD(1 qD) j   (1 qD)T i(T +1)c
=[Y   (i+1)c]
⇥
1  (1 qD)T i
⇤
  c

1
qD
 
✓
1
qD
+T   i
◆
(1 qD)T i
 
  (1 qD)T i(T +1)c
=[Y   (i+1)c]
⇥
1  (1 qD)T i
⇤
  c

1
qD
 
✓
1
qD
+T   i
◆
(1 qD)T i
 
  (1 qD)T i(T +1)c
=
✓
Y   c
qD
◆⇥
1  (1 qD)T i
⇤
  (i+1)c.
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So ,
P(ED) =
t0
Â
i=0
qE(1 qE)i
⇢✓
Y   c
qD
◆⇥
1  (1 qD)T i
⇤
  (i+1)c
 
  (1 qE)t0+1(t0 +1)c
=
✓
Y   c
qD
◆" t0
Â
i=0
qE(1 qE)i  
t0
Â
i=0
qE(1 qE)i(1 qD)T i
#
 
t0
Â
i=0
qE(1 qE)i(i+1)c  (1 qE)t0+1(t0 +1)c
=
✓
Y   c
qD
◆"
1  (1 qE)t0+1  
t0
Â
i=0
qE(1 qE)i(1 qD)T i
#
  c

1
qE
 
✓
1
qE
+ t0 +1
◆
(1 qE)t0+1
 
  (1 qE)t0+1(t0 +1)c
=
✓
Y   c
qE
  c
qD
◆⇥
1  (1 qE)t0+1
⇤
 
✓
Y   c
qD
◆ t0
Â
i=0
qE(1 qE)i(1 qD)T i
=
✓
Y   c
qE
  c
qD
◆⇥
1  (1 qE)t0+1
⇤
 qE
✓
Y   c
qD
◆
(1 qD)T t0
(1 qD)t0+1   (1 qE)t0+1
qE  qD
Analogously,
P(DE) =
✓
Y   c
qE
  c
qD
◆⇥
1  (1 qD)t0+1
⇤
 qD
✓
Y   c
qE
◆
(1 qE)T t0
(1 qD)t0+1   (1 qE)t0+1
qE  qD
.
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Taking differences:
P(ED) P(DE)
=
✓
Y   c
qE
  c
qD
◆⇥
1  (1 qE)t0+1
⇤
 qE
✓
Y   c
qD
◆
(1 qD)T t0
(1 qD)t0+1   (1 qE)t0+1
qE  qD
 
✓
Y   c
qE
  c
qD
◆⇥
1  (1 qD)t0+1
⇤
+qD
✓
Y   c
qE
◆
(1 qE)T t0
(1 qD)t0+1   (1 qE)t0+1
qE  qD
=
✓
Y   c
qE
  c
qD
◆⇥
(1 qD)t0+1   (1 qE)t0+1
⇤
 

qE
✓
Y   c
qD
◆
(1 qD)T t0  qD
✓
Y   c
qE
◆
(1 qE)T t0
 
·
(1 qD)t0+1   (1 qE)t0+1
qE  qD
=
⇢
qE
✓
Y   c
qD
◆⇥
1  (1 qD)T t0
⇤
 qD
✓
Y   c
qE
◆⇥
1  (1 qE)T t0
⇤ 
·
(1 qD)t0+1   (1 qE)t0+1
qE  qD
Let P1t (ED) be the social surplus at time t when task E has been completed (at stage 1).
P1t (DE) is defined analogously. Similar to equation (2.1),
P1t (ED) =
✓
Y   c
qD
◆⇥
1  (1 qD)T t+1
⇤
and
P1t (DE) =
✓
Y   c
qE
◆⇥
1  (1 qE)T t+1
⇤
.
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So
P(ED) P(DE) =
⇥
qEP1t0+1(ED) qDP
1
t0+1(DE)
⇤ (1 qD)t0+1   (1 qE)t0+1
qE  qD
.
Since
(1 qD)t0+1   (1 qE)t0+1
qE  qD
> 0,
P(ED) < P(DE) is equivalent to qEP1t0+1(ED) < qDP
1
t0+1(DE), which will be shown
by induction:
Step 1 Show that qEP1T (ED)< qDP1T (DE):
qEP1T (ED) qDP1T (DE) = qE(qDY   c) = qD(qEY   c) = c(qD  qE)< 0.
Step 2 Show that if qEP1t (ED)< qDP1t (DE) and qEP1t (ED) c, then
qEP1t 1(ED)< qDP1t 1(DE):
qEP1t 1(ED) qDP1t 1(DE)
=qE
⇥
qDY   c+(1 qD)P1t (ED)
⇤
 qD
⇥
qEY   c+(1 qE)P1t (DE)
⇤
=c(qD  qE)+qE(1 qD)P1t (ED) qD(1 qE)P1t (DE)
<c(qD  qE)+ c(1 qD)  c(1 qE)
=0.
105
Step 3 Since t0 is the optimal dropout time when task E is done first,
qEP1t (ED) c,8t   t0 +2.
Then by Step 1 and 2, qEP1t0+1(ED)< qDP
1
t0+1(DE).
B.2 Ex ante Possibility of Bad Project
Proof of Proposition 9. Recall equation (3.7) that characterizes the agent’s ex ante value:
V =V 00 (g0) = c
 
t0
Â
i=0
d i g0
gi
+
T
Â
i=t0 t+1
d i
!
. (3.7)
We can see that V is increasing in t0. Let V (k) denote the agent’s ex ante value given
t0 = k, and define dV (k) =V (k) V (k 1). Then
dV (k) = d k
✓
g0
gk
 1
◆
.
Suppose t0 = k > t⇤0 . Then consider the alternative contract with t0 = k  1. The social
surplus increases because t0 is closer to the conditional efficient t⇤0 . Moreover, the agent’s
ex ante value decreases by dV (k). Therefore, the principal is better off. So t0  t⇤0 .
For the same reason as in proposition 5, he weak inequality is due to the discreteness
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of the model. Following the same argument in the proof of Proposition 5, we parametrize
the model by rates in continuous time and the length of period D. Suppose t0 = t⇤0 for all
D, then for D small enough, if we instead choose t0 = t⇤0 , then the decrease in the agent’s
value is O(D) while the decrease in the social surplus is o(D). The principal will be strictly
better off.
Proof of Proposition 10. Recall that Q1(t) = Ât 1i=0(1 q1)iq1(1 q2)t i is the probability
that only the first breakthrough occurred within t periods when the project is good for sure.
Define
Q01(t) = g
t 1
Â
i=0
(1 q1)iq1(1 q2)t i.
So Q01 is the probability that only the first breakthrough occurred within t periods when
the project is bad with ex ante probability G. Suppose T ⇤ > T ⇤BL.
In the baseline case, the principal is worse off by setting the termination time to T ⇤BL+
1. Therefore
Q1(t0,T ⇤BL)(1 q2)
T ⇤BL t0,T⇤BLd T
⇤BL
(dq2Y   c)
+(1 q1)
t0,T⇤BL(dq1P1(T ⇤BL   t0,T ⇤BL)  c)< d
T c.
When T ⇤ = T ⇤BL, t⇤ > t0. So
gQ1(t⇤0,T ⇤)(1 q2)
T ⇤BL t⇤
0,T⇤BLd T
⇤BL
(dq2Y   c)< d T c.
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Since T ⇤ > T ⇤BL, and the marginal benefit is decreasing in T ,
gQ1(t⇤0,T ⇤)(1 q2)
T ⇤ t⇤0,T⇤d T
⇤
(dq2Y   c)< d T c.
As a result, the principal’s payoff will increase if setting the termination time to T ⇤  
1.
B.3 Impefect Monitoring of Progress
Proof of Lemma 3, Proposition 11 and 13 . Consider the stage 0 agent’s incentives at t =
tG. By working, his value is
q1V̂ 1tG+1 +(1 q)V
0
tG+1 = q1kV
1
tG+1;
by shirking, his value is c. Suppose after the signal reveals stage 1, the principal uses
the one breakthrough optimal contract in proposition 6 as the continuation contract, then
V 1tG+1 = c(T   t).
If q2k(T   t)c < c, the agent at stage 0 does not have incentive to work without
additional payment, and it is possible to find another set of {ŵt , wt} characterized by
proposition 11 such that the stage 0 agent’s IC constraints are just satisfied for all t  t0.
Together with the optimally chosen t0 given T and tG, the social surplus is maximized
while the agent’s ex ante value is minimized. The resulting contract is thus optimal.
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If q2kc(T   t)   c, then the continuation contract after the signal arrives is enough
to incentivize stage 0 agent to work. It is impossible to hold the agent’s ex ante value to
the lower bound c(tG+1). The principal’s payoff can be calculated by taking expectation
over the events that the signal revealing stage 1 arrives at time i before success (probability
of which denoted as yi) and the events that success occurs at time i before signals arrive
(probability of which denoted as y 0i ):
U =
tG+1
Â
i=0
yi
⇥
(P1i  V 1i )  c(i+1)
⇤
+
tG
Â
i=1
y 0i [(Y   ŵt)  c(i+1)]
 
 
1 
tG+1
Â
i=0
yi  
tG
Â
i=1
y 0i
!
c(t0 +1).
From the above expression, it can be seen that to maximize U given T , tG and t0, we
would like to maximize P1i  V 1i and minimize ŵt for each i. Remember that we assume
T  T ⇤. Moreover, T ⇤ is smaller than the optimal termination time for project with
only one breakthrough
j
log1 q
c
qY c
k
. Therefore, conditional on the signal arrives at i,
financing the agent till T and using the rewards in the one-breakthrough optimal contract
maximize P1i  V 1i . Minimizing ŵt requires the IC constraints in (3.9) are binding.
It remains to show that under the specified contract the stage 0 agent’s IC conditions
are satisfied not only at tG, but at all t  tG. We prove it by induction, and show that if
stage 0 IC holds at t +1, it also holds at t.
The stage 0 IC constraint at t is equivalent to V̂ 1t+1  V 0t+1   c/q, which is proved in
109
the following:
V̂ 1t+1  V 0t+1 =kV 1t+1 +(1 k)(c+V̂ 1t+2) V 0t+1
=kV 1t+1 +(1 k)(c+V̂ 1t+2) qV̂t+2   (1 q)V 0t+2
=k(c+V 1t+2)+(1 k)(c+V̂ 1t+2) qV̂ 1t+2   (1 q)V 0t+2
=c+k(V 1t+2  V̂ 1t+2)+(1 q)(V̂ 1t+2  V 0t+2)
 c+(1 q)c
q
=
c
q
.
The first equality is because stage 1 agent before signal arrives is indifferent between
working and shirking; the second equality is by the induction assumption that stage 0
agent has an incentive to work at t + 1; the third equality is because the continuation
contract after the signal arrives at time i gives the agent a value of (T   i)c. The inequality
is again using the induction assumption.
Proof of Proposition 14. Let UF(t) be the principal’s payoff in the fully observed progress
case with stage 0 dropout time t, and ŨF =UF(t0) is the payoff from choosing the optimal
t̃0. By assumption, ŨF is strictly higher than the payoff from any other UF(t). Suppose
k = 1 e . Since both the total surplus and the agent’s ex ante payoff are continuous in k ,
there exists a function f (k) such that the principal’s payoff Ufrom choosing tG = t0 = t̃0
satisfies U   ŨF   f (k), and f (k) converges to 0 as k converges to 0. Again by continu-
ity, choosing any other tG = t 00 gives the principal a payoff no larger than U
F(t0)0+ f 0(e)
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for some f 0 that converges to 0 as e converges. Therefore, for sufficiently small e , the
principal is strictly better off by choosing tG = t0 = t̃0.
The same continuity argument holds for the case where k = e with e small enough.
Since T  T ⇤, in the no signal case, the principal would like to finance the agent until T .
And she would like to do the same with k close enough to 0.
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Appendix C
Appendices to Chapter 4
Proof of Lemma 4. First, we show that st(p) 2 {0,dV 0t ,dV 1t }.
1. If st(p) 2 (0,d 0t ) for some p, then it is equivalent to st(p) = 0 because neither type
of agent will accept the offer.
2. Suppose for a set of offers B1 with positive measure, st(p) > dV 1t for all p 2 B1.
Let b1 = E
h
st(p) dV 1t
   p 2 B1
i
. Then it is equivalent to using st(p) = dV 1t for
all p 2 B1 and making an unconditional payment P(B1)b1 to both types of agents.
In lemma 1 we have shown that unconditional payments are suboptimal when there
are no buyers. The same argument holds here. We can replace the unconditional
payment P(B)b with an increase in reward for success P(B)b/q. All incentives
conditions will still hold and the total surplus remains the same, but the agent’s ex
ante payoff is lower.
3. Suppose for a set of offers B0 with positive measure, st(p) 2 (dV 0t ,dV 1t ) for all
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p 2 B0. Then it is equivalent to using st(p) = dV 1t for all p 2 B0 and making an
unconditional payment only to the stage 0 agent. The principal is better off by
setting st(p) = dV 1t and not making the unconditional payment. Again incentives
conditions will still hold and the total surplus remains the same, but the agent’s ex
ante payoff is lower.
It remains to show that st(p) is weakly increasing in p. Suppose there exist two sets of
prices B0 and B1 such that
s(p) = dV 0t , 8p 2 B0,
s(p) = dV 1t , 8p 2 B1,
P(B0) = P(B1),
and
E
⇥
p
  B0
⇤
> E
⇥
p
  B1
⇤
.
Then the principal is better off by setting
s(p) = dV 0t , 8p 2 B1,
s(p) = dV 1t , 8p 2 B0.
Proof of Lemma 5. After success or termination, the environment is stationary. Remem-
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ber that the offer pt = z+1{nt = 2}dY , with z ⇠ G(·). So without success, pt follows
distribution G(·), and after success, pt  dY follows G(·).
When the project has been terminated without success,
P = max
p
(
l
Z
z p
zg(z)dz+(lG(p)+1 l )dP
)
.
The first order condition is necessary and sufficient for optimality, and the value is maxi-
mized at p = dP. In other words, the acquisition offer should be accepted if and only if
it is no less than the continuation value after rejecting it. So
P = l
Z
z dP
zg(z)dz+(lG(dP)+1 l )dP,
or
(1 d )P = l
Z
z dP
(z dP)g(z)dz. (C.1)
The left hand side (LHS) is strictly increasing in P and the right hand side (RHS) is
strictly decreasing in P. When P = 0, LHS < RHS and when P ! •, LHS > RHS. So
equation (C.1) has a unique solution.
Similarly, the principal’s value after success follows
P = max
p
⇢
y+l
Z
z+dY p
(z+dY )g(z)dz+(lG(p dY )+1 l )dP
 
,
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and optimal cutoff is p = dP. The equation that solves P is
P = y+l
Z
z+dY dP
(z+dY )g(z)dz+(lG(dP dY )+1 l )dP.
Arranging terms, we get
(1 d )(P Y ) =
Z
z+dY dP
(z+dY  dP)g(z)dz, (C.2)
which characterizes P. Moreover, equations (C.1) and (C.2) imply that
P = P+Y.
Proof of Proposition 15. The problem (P) is equivalent to
max
T B,tB0 ,w,µ0,µ1
P00  V 00
s.t. V 0t   c+dV 0t+1,8t  tB0 ,
V 0t = c+dV 0t+1,8t 2 (tB0 ,T B]; (IC: Stage 0) (P’)
V 0t   c+dV 0t+1,8t  T B0 ; ( IC: Stage 1)
wt   0, 8t  T B0 . (LL)
Since it is not optimal to choose T B = •, and there exists a w such that it is not optimal
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for any wt to exceed w, the maximization problem is to maximize a continuous function
over a compact set. Therefore the solution exists.
Proof of Proposition 16 . In any optimal contract, the agent ex ante payoff V 00 must be
minimized given (T B, tB0 ,p0t ,p1t ). Otherwise, we can implement the same (T B, tB0 ,p0t ,p1t )
yielding the same total surplus P00 while giving the agent a smaller ex ante payoff, and
the principal will be strictly better off.
We will show that to minimize V 00 , the inequalities (4.2) must hold with equality for all
t  tB0 . That is to say, the stage 0 agent’s IC conditions must be always binding whenever
he is induced to work. Moreover, the stage 1 agent’s IC conditions must also be binding
for t > tB0 +1.
Rearranging stage 0 agent’s IC conditions (4.2), we get
dq(1 l µ1t )(V 1t+1  V 0t+1)  c, 8t  tB0 ,
or
V 1t+1  V 0t+1 +
c
dq(1 l µ1t )
, 8t  tB0 . (C.3)
Substituting (C.3) back into (4.2), we get
V 0t   c+dV 0t+1 +
l µ1t
q(1 l µ1t )
c, 8t  tB0 . (C.4)
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Stage 1 agent is supposed to work for all t  T B, and his IC conditions are
V 1t = qwt +d (1 q)V 1t+1
  c+dV 1t+1, 8t = 1, ...,T B. (C.5)
Note that if success does not happen, then stage 1 agent’s continuation value is always
dV 1t+1, no matter whether the acquisition offer arrives or not, because by selling the com-
pany stage 1 agent gets at most dV 1t+1. Recursively using inequalities (C.5) for t > tB0 +1,
we get
V 1t   c
T B t
Â
i=0
d i, 8t > tB0 +1. (C.6)
Substituting inequality (C.6) into equation (4.3), for all t = tB0 +1, ...,T
B  1,
V 0t   c+dl µ1t c
T B t 1
Â
i=0
d i +d (1 l µ1t )V 0t+1,
or
V 0t   c
T B t
Â
i=0
d i   d (1 l µ1t )
0
@V 0t+1   c
T B (t+1)
Â
i=0
d i
1
A
Substituting V 0t   cÂ
T B (t+1)
i=0 d i iteratively and using V 0T B = c, we get
V 0t   c
T B t
Â
i=0
d i, 8t = tB0 +1, ...,T B. (C.7)
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Recursively using inequalities (C.4) for t  tB0 and equations (C.7) for t > tB0 , we get
V 0t   c
T B t
Â
i=0
d i + c
tB0
Â
i=t
d i t l µ
1
i
q(1 l µ1i )
,8t  tB0 . (C.8)
In particular,
V 00   c
T B
Â
i=0
d i + c
tB0
Â
i=0
d i l µ
1
i
q(1 l µ1i )
. (C.9)
If and only if inequalities (4.2) for all t  tB0 and (C.5) for all t > tB0 +1 hold with equalities,
inequalities (C.4) for all t  tB0 and (C.5) for all t > tB0 hold with equalities, which is
equivalent to (C.8), and in particular (C.9) hold with equalities. So the agent’s ex ante
value V 00 is minimized at the lower bound if and only if stage 0 agent’s IC conditions are
binding for t  tB0 and stage 1 agent’s IC conditions are binding for t > tB0 +1.
When V 00 is minimized, the agent’s value functions V
n
t are
V 0t = c
T B t
Â
i=0
d i + c
tB0
Â
i=t
d i t l µ
1
i
q(1 l µ1i )
, 8t = 0, ..., tB0 ;
V 0t = c
T B t
Â
i=0
d i, 8t = tB0 +1, ...,T B.
V 1t =V
0
t +
c
dq(1 l µ1t 1)
, 8t = 1, ..., tB0 +1;
V 1t =V
0
t = c
T B t
Â
i=0
d i, 8t = tB0 +2, ...,T B.
118
The reward function wt can be derived from (C.5):
wt = dV 1t+1 +
V 1t  dV 1t+1
q
, 8t = 1, ...,T B.
We have already set stage 0 agent’s IC constraints binding for t  tB0 and stage 1 agent’s
IC constraints binding for t   tB0 + 2. It remains to verify that stage 1 agent’s IC for
t  tB0 +1:
8t  tB0 , V 1t  dV 1t+1 =V 0t  dV 0t+1 +
c
dq(1 l µ1t 1)
  c
q(1 l µ1t )
= c+
l µ1t c
q(1 l µ1t )
+
c
dq(1 l µ1t 1)
  c
q(1 l µ1t )
= c+
c
q
 
1
d (1 l µ1t 1)
 1
!
> c;
V 1tB0 +1
 dV 1tB0 +2 =V
0
tB0 +1
+
c
dq(1 l µ1tB0
)
 dV 0tB0 +2
= c+
c
dq(1 l µ1tB0
)
> c.
When stage 1 agent’s IC constraints are satisfied, automatically wt is non-negative for all
t = 1, ...,T B. So the specified wt indeed induces the stage 0 agent to work for t  tB0 and
stage 1 agent to work for t  T B while minimizing the agent’s ex ante payoff.
Proof of Proposition 17. Fix t  tB0 . Iteratively substituting P0t 0 ,P
1
t 0 using equation (4.4)
119
and (4.5) for t 0  t and get
P00 = r0t d tP0t +r1t d tP1t +K({p0t 0 , p
1
t 0}t 0<t), (C.10)
where K({p0t 0 , p
1
t 0}t 0<t) is a function of p
0
t 0 and p
1
t 0 for t
0 < t, and
r0t = (1 q)t
t 1
’
i=0
(1 l (1 G(p0t )))
is the probability that the project is at stage 0 and no acquisition offer has been accepted
by period t, and
r1t = q(1 q)t 1
t 1
Â
j=0
 
j 1
’
i=0
(1 l (1 G(p0i )))
t 1
’
i= j
(1 l (1 G(p1j)))
!
is the probability that the project is at stage 1 and no acquisition offer has been accepted
by period t.
First note that for all t 0, Pnt 0 only depends on {p
0
t , p1t } for t   t 0. So from equation
(4.4) and (4.5), we have
∂P0t
∂ p0t
= (1 q)lg(p0t )(dP0t+1   p0t );
∂P1t
∂ p0t
= 0;
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and
∂P0t
∂ p1t
= qlg(p1t )(dP1t+1   p1t );
∂P1t
∂ p1t
= (1 q)lg(p1t )(dP1t+1   p1t ).
So
∂P00
∂ p0t
= d tr0t (1 q)lg(p0t )(dP0t+1   p0t );
∂P00
∂ p1t
= d t(r0t q+r1t (1 q))lg(p1t )(dP1t+1   p1t ).
Remember from proposition 16 that
V 00 = c
T B
Â
i=0
d i + c
tB0
Â
i=0
d i l µ
1
i
q(1 l µ1i )
= c
T B
Â
i=0
d i + c
tB0
Â
i=0
d i l (1 G(p
1
i ))
q(1 l (1 G(p1i )))
.
So
∂V 00
∂ p0t
= 0
and
∂V 00
∂ p1t
= d t lg(p
1
t )
q[1 l (1 G(p1t ))]2
c.
So
∂U
∂ p0t
= d tr0t (1 q)lg(p0t )(dP0t+1   p0t ),
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and
∂U
∂ p1t
= d t(r0t q+r1t (1 q))lg(p1t )(dP1t+1   p1t )+d t
lg(p1t )
q[1 l (1 G(p1t ))]2
c
= d tlg(p1t )
✓
(r0t q+r1t (1 q))(dP1t+1   p1t )+
c
q[1 l (1 G(p1t ))]2
◆
| {z }
(⇤)
.
For p0t , clearly optimality requires
p0t = dP0t+1.
For p1t , the term (*) is strictly positive when p1t < dP1t+1; for p1t < dPt+1, (*) is strictly
decreasing to negative and concave. So optimality requires
q[1 l (1 G(p1t ))]2(p1t  dP1t+1) =
c
r0t q+r1t (1 q)
,
or
p1t = dP1t+1 +
c
(r0t q+r1t (1 q))q[1 l (1 G(p1t ))]2
,
and the above equation has a unique solution and p1t   dP1t+1 is increasing in c and de-
creasing in r0t q+r1t (1 q).
We have characterized optimality conditions regarding p0t for t  t0. For t > 0, since
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neither µ0t or µ1t will affect V 00 , optimality requires p0t , p1t maximize P00, and therefore
p0t = dP0t+1; p1t = dP1t+1.
Moreover, since P0T B+1 = P, by recursion we have Pt = P for t > t0 and pt = dP for
t   t0.
Proof of Proposition 18. First, I show that the inequalities hold weakly for any set of
parameters.
In the no-buyer case, recall from Proposition 3 that
T = max{T 0 : P00,T 0  P
0
0,T 0 1   d
T 0c},
where
P00,T  P00,T 1 = Q1(t0,T )Q0(t̂)d T (dqY   c)+Q0(t0,T )d t0,T (dqP1(t̂)  c).
Suppose T B is the optimal termination time in the case with buyers and T B > T . Remem-
ber µ1t (µ0t ) is the probability that the stage 1 (stage 0) company is sold in period t. Note
that given G(·), the distribution function of offers, µ1t and µ0t are bounded away from 0.
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So
P0,B0,T B  P
0,B
0,T B 1 = f1(µ
t
0)Q1(t0,T B)Q0(t̂
B)d T
B
(dqY   c)
+ f2(µ t0,µ t1)Q0(t0,T B)d
tB
0,T B (dqP1(t̂)  c).
where f1 and f2 are positive, smaller than 1 and strictly decreasing in t. So
P0,B0,T B  P
0,B
0,T B 1 < P
0
0,T B  P
0
0,T B 1 < d
T c < d T
B l µ1T B
q(1 l µ1T B)
c.
Therefore, the principal is better off by choosing T B  1 instead of T B as the termination
time of financing.
Next I show under some parameters the inequality is strict. Let D denote the length of
a period, and let the probability of a breakthrough, the cost of investment and the discount
factor be functions of the period length, q = qrD, c = crD, l = lrD and d = e rD. Note
that given G(·), µ0t and µ1t are bounded away from 0 for any D, because whenever the
offer is larger than P, the company is sold. Moreover, P is bounded as D ! 0. As a
result, f1(µ t0) and f2(µ t0,µ t1) are bounded away from 1, and there exists some e such that
as D ! 0,
P0,B0,T  P
0,B
0,T 1 < P
0
0,T  P00,T 1   e.
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At the same time, there exists some e 0 such that for all D,
P00,T  P00,T 1 > d T c  e 0,
because by the theorem of maximum, all values are continuous in T for any D.
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